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QUANTITY VERSUS QUALITY: EXPERIMENTING WITH THE MARGINS FOR
SOCIAL INFORMATION
JONATHAN LAFKY AND ALISTAIR J. WILSON
A BSTRACT. People share their experiences of goods and services online, through reviews, ratings
and endorsements on social networks, potentially generating welfare-improving information that can
help subsequent consumers make better, more informed decisions. While the economics literature
has focused on questions of alignment and the intensive quality of provided information, another
tension is extensive: in the absence of an incentive, many might choose not to provide information
at all. We study three different incentives that encourage information transmission on the extensive
margin, examining the tradeoffs between quality and quantity of information. Our findings indicate
substantial efficiency gains can be made relative to no incentives, even when the incentives damage the preference alignment between those sending and receiving information. In particular, our
results point to a partially aligned incentive (similar to a referral or sales commission) as robustly
encouraging the provision of information while not producing substantial reductions in quality.

The sharing of information via reviews, ratings and social networks has become an important
component of online commerce, helping to reduce uncertainty about unseen products, services,
and workers. Although consumers benefit from accurate information on product quality, even
small nuisance costs can deter others from providing their opinions. An obvious solution to this
problem is to reward those providing information. However, dependent on the parties shaping these
incentives, there is the potential to influence not only the likelihood of information being provided,
but also the content of that information. In this paper, we theoretically and experimentally examine
the effectiveness of different incentives structures in the presence of this quality versus quantity
tradeoff.
Focusing on the broad strategic tensions, we examine three incentive schemes that represent
qualitatively different ways of paying for information provision. The three environments vary
over the conditions (and motivating source) for a payment, changing the alignment of preference
between those sending and receiving information. The end effect is an incentive that varies between
common interests, only partial alignment of interests, and no alignment at all. Examining how each
incentive influences both the quantity and quality of information, first in theory and then in practice
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Lafky: Carleton College, 321 Willis Hall, Northfield, MN; jlafky@carleton.edu. Wilson: University of Pittsburgh,
Department of Economics, 230 Bouquet Street, Pittsburgh, PA; alistair@pitt.edu. Our thanks to the following: John
Asker, John Duffy, Matthew Embrey, Emanuel Vespa, Lise Vesterlund, Stephanie Wang, and audiences at the ESA,
SEA, George Mason, Lafayette and the Federal Trade Commission. Any mistakes within are obviously not attributable
to anyone but ourselves.
1

in the laboratory, we explain how the intensive and extensive margins of information transmission
might be efficiently traded off.
Our attention to both the intensive and extensive margins for information-sharing is in contrast
to the literature in economics, which generally focuses on the intensive margin. The literature typically measures the amount of information shared as the interests of the informed and uninformed
parties grow further apart, where the provision of some form of information is taken for granted.
While the comparative static here is intuitive—that preference misalignment decreases information sharing—the theoretical literature suggests that even a small biases on the sender’s part can be
quite destabilizing. In contrast, the experimental literature has documented a much smaller level
effect, with greater honesty than predicted.
Our contribution is to include an extensive margin, and to assess the effects of incentives for
information transmission that vary on both margins. Concurring with previous work, our experimental results replicate the finding that preference misalignment is not as pernicious to information
quality as predicted by theory. However, building upon this result, we show that this should make
us more willing to trade off some alignment of interests in order to have the information paid for
by a third party. In contrast, our incentive that maintains common interests over the provided information does lead to more total information transfer, but as the receivers have to pay for it, their
net outcomes are actually made worse than the absence of any incentive. Finally, for an incentive
that produces full misalignment of interests, we find the worst information transfer rates across our
experiments.
While very distorted incentives to provide information do seem to fail in the long run when all
parties are commonly aware of their presence, it could be that third parties still choose to covertly
offer them. For example, with celebrity endorsements of products where the paid-for nature of the
post is not disclosed. If receivers are unaware of the incentives supporting information (and falsely
believe senders have common cause with them) third parties might be able to produce large shortrun gains, while simultaneously poisoning the well in the long-run. This insight prompts the final
step in our analysis, where we demonstrate that some commonly known degree of misalignment
may in fact be desirable, as it can serve as an inoculation against the introduction of more-distortive
incentives.
Our results highlight a previously unrecognized advantage to commission-like incentives in
multi-product environments, and may help explain their prevalence. Commission-style incentives
are commonplace, including brokers or realtors providing advice between two competing stocks
or houses (an explicit commission on eventual purchases), servers providing recommendations
over which dessert to order from a menu (an increased tip), or product review websites (referral
commissions via hyperlinks). In each case, the informed party can have partially aligned interests
with the decision maker over which of the competing options is better (a particular stock, house,
flavor of ice cream, or consumer product), but is misaligned over the decisions to buy anything at at
2

all. While there certainly are cases of unbiased information provision paid for directly before final
choices are made (subscription-based advice websites, fixed-fee consultants or inspectors, etc.),
many sources of information that we commonly make use of are only partially aligned, and are not
paid for directly before advice is proffered. Our paper posits the idea that this partial misalignment
could be in our best interest.
As with most theoretical and experimental work, our paper’s environment elides features present
in many practical settings in order to isolate our main question, in this case the strategic tradeoffs
between the quantity and quality of information. As such we focus on an abstract uninformed
receiver who must make a decision between two ex ante symmetric products and an outside option
(not buying either product). To aid in this decision our environment has an informed sender with
a powerful, though imperfect, signal. Extensive-margin frictions over information sharing arise
due to costs of providing and acquiring information, while intensive-margin frictions are generated by a conditional payment to the sender based upon the receiver’s choice. Our experiments
are tailored toward eliciting controlled comparative statics on the following questions: (i) How
often do senders provide information?; (ii) What is the informational content of messages when
provided?; (iii) Do receivers seek out the provided information?; and (iv) When viewed, how does
the provided information shape the receiver’s subsequent choice? We address these questions in
an unincentivized baseline environment, and in three incentive structures that reward senders for
providing information.
Our first incentive (labeled Receiver) has those making use of the information pay for it. While
maintaining common interests between sender and receiver over the receiver’s final choice, the
treatment creates a distributional tension, where receivers must transfer some of the gains from the
information exchange to the sender. Here the incentive mirrors situations where a final decision
makers is choosing whether to pay for disinterested advice.
Our next two environments trade off alignment of interests by turning to a third party to pay for
the provision. Our second incentive, which we call, Marketplace, as it aligns senders with the sales
interests of the platform where competing products are sold, rewards senders contingent upon sales
of any available product. While creating some misalignment between senders and receivers over
whether to buy anything at all, the incentive does maintain the alignment of interests over which of
the competing products is better. For example, while a broker on commission would always want
you to make a purchase, they would ceteris paribus prefer you purchase the superior offering.
Finally, our third environment, which we call Producer, creates a full misalignment in preferences by directly incentivizing the sender to endorse a particular product, eliminating any alignment between the different sides of the information exchange, and instead aligning the sender with
the interests of a particular producer.
Across these three incentive structures, our results suggest that Marketplace incentives do the
best job at balancing the quantity/quality tradeoff for information transmission. Relative to our
3

baseline, many more senders choose to provide information, and while there is a decrease in the
informational quality, it is more than made up for with increased quantity.
Below we discuss the related literature, before setting out our environment and design in Section 2. In Section 3 we outline our results, and then in Section 4 we extend them in a discussion of
two counterfactuals examining third-party interests. Finally, we conclude in Section 5.
1.1. Related Literature. The theoretical starting point for the information transmission literature
is Crawford and Sobel (1982), which describes the impossibility of full revelation with cheap talk
when senders of information have misaligned preferences with receivers. Where the senders have
state-dependent preferences, the upper bound for information revelation is shown to be decreasing
in the size of the misalignment. Our aligned-incentive institutions have state-dependent preferences
for senders with zero bias term, and with a larger message space full revelation would be possible.
However, our misaligned-incentives bear more resemblance to the state-independent preferences
with multiple dimensions in Chakraborty and Harbaugh (2010), where the sender is misaligned in
one or many of these dimensions. In our setting these two dimensions are the particular product,
and the receiver’s willingness to pay (WTP). The main innovation in our paper’s model in is the
joint examination of both the quality of provided information and whether it is provided at all, as
our environment incorporates communication frictions.1
A body of work has experimentally examined tensions between agents in the Crawford and
Sobel environment.2 The main experimental finding here is that subjects over-communicate relative to theory: senders tell the truth more often than predicted, and receivers infer honesty too
much, though with a large heterogeneity explained via level-k thinking. In a setting closer to ours,
Wilson (2014) examines the behavior of subjects in aligned-interest groups with similar two-sided
costs. He finds subjects under-respond to the costs of sending messages, and overpay to acquire
information, relative to the gains obtained. In contrast, our own paper examines tradeoffs between
alignment and incentives to rate at all. Taking away the extensive margin Chung and Harbaugh
(2016) examine the extent to which observed play matches the equilibrium prediction in a persuasion setting. They find that messages are persuasive, even in those environments where theory
predicts they should not be, matching a result we find in our misaligned treatments.3
One natural application of our environment is to online rating systems, and several papers have
examined incentives specifically in the context of online ratings. There is evidence that ratings
given in the absence of explicit incentives exhibit bias due to differential rating frequency, as in Hu
1

A related theory paper with costs to both senders and receivers is Dewatripont and Tirole (2005), though there costs
vary over the precision of articulation or interpretation of the message. See also Dessein and Santos (2006); CalvóArmengol et al. (forthcoming) for models of endogenous communication with costs.
2
See Dickhaut et al. (1995), Cai and Wang (2006), Wang et al. (2010). For extensions to multiple senders or receivers
see Lai et al. (2011); Vespa and Wilson (2014) and Battaglini and Makarov (2014).
3
See also Charness and Garoupa (2000) which examines the extent to which reputation affects revelation, where
senders have a state-independent preference to induce sales.
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et al. (2009) and Lafky (2014), which demonstrate the tendency for raters to over-report positive
or negative experiences, relative to moderate outcomes.4 There is also some evidence for rating
biases due to self-selection into the market, as in Li and Hitt (2008), where consumers who are
predisposed towards a product are more likely to rate early in the product’s lifespan, leading to
artificially positive information.
There is a clear incentive for firms to attempt to influence the information provided about
their products, either directly by creating fraudulent ratings (Mayzlin et al., 2014) or indirectly
by compensating raters. Providing explicit incentives for ratings can create obvious conflict-ofinterest problems, in which compensated raters may give biased evaluations of products. The
potential for such bias has led the Federal Trade Commission to enact rules requiring the disclosure
of any relationship between firms and those endorsing their products via the internet.5 There is a
small literature studying interventions designed to increase rating provision, including rebates (Li
and Xiao, 2014), social comparisons (Chen et al., 2010) social identity (Wang, 2010), but to our
knowledge, no existing work examines the relative performance of different incentive structures
for ratings.
2. F RAMEWORK AND E XPERIMENTAL D ESIGN
We will examine a representative final decision maker R (the receiver, he) making a choice
between one of two (ex ante identical) risky choices, A or B, or a known-value outside option R.
Each of the risky options is associated with a lottery φA and φB , represented in the experiment by
two urns, Urn A and Urn B.
To make his decision, the receiver is provided with a message m from a peer (the sender, she)
who has prior experience with one of the products X ∈ {A, B}, from which she drew a realization
x. The main thrust of our experiments will be to assess how much information is transferred from
the sender to the receiver, and the extent to which three alternative institutions might improve that
transfer.
The timing of the game in our experiments is as follows:
(1) Nature draws the two product lotteries φA and φB , where each is an iid draw from a set of
possible lotteries Φ, with pr = Pr {φr }.
(2) The sender obtains a single realization x from one of the two lotteries φX , where X ∈
{A, B} is selected with equal probability.
(3) The sender decides whether or not to provide a meaningful message/rating m ∈ M to
the receiver—where in our experiments M is a one-to-five scale—or to send an empty
4

Also see Bolton et al. (2013) with respect to managing the distortive effects of reciprocity when ratings are two-way.
FTC press release on social media endorsements: https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/attachments/press-releases/ftcstaff-reminds-influencers-brands-clearly-disclose-relationship/influencer_template.pdf)
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message m∅ . If the sender chooses any m ∈ M she incurs a cost cS , where choosing
m = m∅ is free.
(4) The receiver observes whether there was a provided message and chooses whether or not
to view if there is. If he chooses to view the message he incurs a fixed cost cR > 0.
(5) The receiver draws an outside-option value ω and makes a choice Z ∈ {A, B, R}.
(6) The receiver obtains the outcome wR (Z, ω) equal to the reservation value ω if he chooses
R, and equal to an independent realization of the lottery φZ if he chooses Z ∈ {A, B}.
The payoff to the receiver is given by
uR (Z, ρ, m) = wR (Z; ω) − cR · 1 {m 6= m∅ , View} ;
while the sender’s payoff is
uS (m, ρ, Z) = x + α · wR (Z; ω) − cS · 1 {m 6= m∅ } .
The sender is assumed to derive utility from her own lottery outcome x, but also experiences a
positive spillover from the receiver’s choice with weight α > 0, reflecting a gain from helping the
receiver.6
The main tension in the above model stems from the messaging costs. The sender’s messaging
costs (cS ) are privately incurred, but when α is small, the weight placed on the public benefits is
also small. In many parameterizations (in particular our experimental ones) the resulting effect
will be underprovision of information.
As an example, suppose that the sender’s experienced outcome x is a realization from lottery
A, denoting this information as IxA . If the sender’s information were perfectly revealed to the

receiver, he would be able to make a better decision, with a benefit of ∆wR (IxA ) := wR Z(IxA ) −
wR (Z(I∅ )). Moreover, if our receiver is a stand-in for K representative final decision makers the
social benefit generated by the information transfer is therefore (K + α)∆wR (IxA ) while the social
cost from communication frictions is (K · cR + cS ).
While the precise benefits of information transfer will vary based on the sender’s experience
x, and how informative that experience is about the lottery φX , information transfer is expected to
be socially desirable even for moderate communication frictions. However, as we will discuss in
further detail below, the equilibrium predictions are for inefficient communication, where senders
are predicted to underprovide information, sending the empty message m∅ even for low send costs.
Though the baseline environment above is predicted to be inefficient, there are potential incentive devices that might increase the transfer of socially valuable information. We examine one
obvious candidate to economists (a transfer from receivers to senders) as well as two alternative
incentives schemes motivated by those in common use. Below we provide more specific details
6

Note that for the model α can be made arbitrarily small. The modeling choice here is to start out with a baseline model
reflecting an informational public good, where all parties strictly benefit from the transfer of high-quality information.
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on our experimental environment and parameterization, as well as the three alternative incentive
schemes, where we will come back to a discussion of the equilibrium predictions in section 2.2.
2.1. Experimental Design. We use a between-subject experimental design across the four treatment environments, where a session consists of 30 rounds. The first treatment is a Baseline environment with no transfers. The other three incorporate conditional transfers to the sender, and
affect the alignment between the interests of the sender and receiver.7
– A Receiver-funded transfer conditioned on a message being viewed. Conditional on provision, the sender and receiver share common interests, over both the superior product, and
the cardinal willingness to pay.
– A Marketplace-funded transfer conditioned on a viewed message and the receiver choosing
either of the products. Conditional on provision, the sender and receiver share partial
interests over which product is ordinally better, but not over the willingness to pay for that
product where they are misaligned.
– A Producer-funded transfer from X, conditioned on the receiver choosing the same product X. Conditional on provision, the sender and receiver have no common interests.
Determining the state. The primary uncertainties in the model are the lotteries φA and φB , which
in the experiment are called Urn A and Urn B. Each urn is filled with two balls labeled with an
integer between 1 and 100, so the possible realization set is Θ = {1, . . . , 100}. In every round t
and for every sender i, the two urns are independently filled via the following procedure: (i) An
initial ball θ1 is placed in the urn by a uniform draw over Θ; ii) with probability 1/2, the second
ball θ2 is another independent uniform draw from Θ, and with probability 1/2 the second ball is an
exact copy of the first ball, so θ2 = θ1 . Urn X is therefore completely determined by the two balls
in it, θ1X and θ2X , and a draw from the urn is a lottery 21 · θ1X ⊕ 12 · θ2X .

The set of all possible urn lotteries in our experiment is Φ = 21 · θ ⊕ 21 · θ0 |∃θ, θ0 ∈ Θ . Given
the filling procedure outlined above the prior probability pr of the lottery φr = 21 · θ ⊕ 12 · θ0 is given
by

1/10,000
if θ 6= θ0 ,
pr =
101/20,000 if θ = θ0 .
Without any knowledge on the specific realized lottery φr , the expected outcome is given by
θ̄ = 50.5. However, a single draw from the urn (with replacement) provides a great deal of
information. The expected outcome of a new draw from the urn given knowledge of a previous
7

In terms of defining alignment of interest over the information transferred, one easy definition is the extent to which
a sender would reveal their signal in equilibrium. In our common-interest environments, the sender would fully reveal
her cardinal signal if it was free to do so. In contrast, with partially aligned interests, the sender would only reveal
that the signal was in one of two subsets. With no common interests, the sender would reveal no information. An
alternative definition for alignment is the number of distinct posteriors possible in equilibrium.
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draw x is νX (x) = 3/4 · x + 1/4 · θ̄.8 The experimental parameterization is designed to ensure that
the sender’s information is very valuable to the receiver while not being perfectly informative.
Aside from the two lottery draws, our experimental environment has two other random components: a sending cost cS and a reservation ω. For the sending cost cS our experiment makes an
iid draw from G = {−$0.49, . . . , $2.50}, where the probability of each cost level is linearly decreasing to zero at cS = $2.50.9 The reservation value ωj is a draw from H = Θ = {1, . . . , 100},
where the probability of each reservation value is decreasing linearly to zero for ω = 100.10
In each experimental round, each subject performs the roles of both a sender and a receiver.11 In
each round t the game timing is as follows: The subject first makes a choice of urn Xit ∈ {A, B}
to draw a ball from, obtaining the realization xit from the lottery φX
it , where the subject earns
12
$0.05 × xit from the first stage. The sender’s information is therefore IitS = (Xit , xit ), which

B
is pertinent information to a receiver subject j who will makes a choice over φA
it , φit , R in the
second stage.13
After observing their drawn ball’s value xit , each subject is asked to provide as a message
an integer rating from one to five for either urn, so the set of available non-empty messages is:
M = {1A , 2A , 3A , 4A , 5A } ∪ {1B , 2B , 3B , 4B , 5B }.14 After selecting a provisional rating m̂it ∈ M,
the subject was then informed of the realized cost of sending, cSit , and chose whether or not to
send the selected rating, mit ∈ {m̂it , m∅ }, incurring the (possibly negative) cost cSit only if they
chose to send. Our experiment guarantees a minimum level of alignment between the sender and
the receiver by setting an explicit altruism term α = 0.1, providing i with $0.10 for every dollar
earned by the matched receiver j in their second-stage choice Zjt .
In addition to these baseline costs and payments for the sender, in our three transfer environments we provide an opportunity to earn an additional T = $2.00, where the condition for payment
8

Half the time the new draw is the same exact ball drawn previously (value x), a quarter of the time the new draw is
a copy of the previously drawn ball (value x again), and a quarter of the time the new draw is an unrelated ball (with
expectation θ̄ = 50.5).
9
The send-cost support includes negative values, as we wanted to have an interior level of provision in the baseline.
The interpretation of a negative send cost is a sender who derives explicit benefit from sending a message.
10
In the experiment we draw two send costs uniformly from G, and give the subject the lower cost of the two, so that
2 2.5−c
the ex ante probability of send cost cSi is approximately 300
3 .For the reservation we draw two uniform draws from
Θ, where the reservation draw ωj is the lower value. The probability of a reservation draw ω is therefore approximated
2 100−ω
by 100
100 .
11
Our choice to make all subjects both senders and receivers was made so the environment was symmetric ex ante in
the sense that the entire population can both benefit from other’s information provision and provide it themselves.
12
Though xit is simply a signal draw from the point of information provision, we wanted experimental senders to
experience a payoff from their draw.
13
In each round the experimental match procedure randomizes subjects to an identity i ∈ {1, . . . , n} on a circle. The
subject assigned to identity i acts as a sender to the clockwise subject with identity j = mod (i, n) + 1 and the
receiver to the counter-clockwise
subject with identity k = mod (i − 2, n) + 1 in the second stage, making their

B
second-stage choice from φA
,
φ
kt
kt , R .
14
Again, we had many choices over the message space, where our experimental choice was to use a simple one-to-five
rating that is likely familiar to subjects.
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ψ S (m, ρ, Z) varies by treatment. Round payoffs from the sending decision are therefore:
uS (mit , Zjt , ρjt ; cSit ) = $0.05×xit +$0.01·wR (Zjt )−cSit ·1 {mit 6= m∅ }+$2.00×ψ S (mit , Zjt , ρjt ).
In the second stage of the game subject j receives the urns A and B from subject i.15 If there is
a provided message mit ∈ M, the receiver is informed a rating was sent and must decide whether
or not to view it, ρjt , ∈ {View, Not}. If the message is viewed the receiver incurs a fixed cost
cR = $0.05 in all four institutions, where in the Receiver treatment an additional amount t = $0.50
brings the total view cost to $0.55.16
The receiver’s information set at this point is given by Ijt —either observing the specific rating
sent if they view, Ijt = {mit }; that a rating was provided but not viewed, Ijt = {mit ∈ M}; or
that no rating was provided, Ijt = {mit = m∅ }. To gather more information we ask the receiver to
first make a provisional decision between the two urns Ẑjt ∈ {A, B}, after which they
n are informed
o
of the reservation draw ωjt . They are then asked to make a final choice Zjt ∈

Ẑjt , R : either

take a realization zjt from the provisionally chosen urn Ẑjt , or stick with the known reservation
value ωjt . The receiver’s consumption payoff wR (Zjt ) is then given by $0.10 × zjt or $0.10 × ωjt .
Receivers therefore obtain $0.10 multiplied by the value of the final ball selected. The total payoff
from the receiver phase is subsequently:
uR (mit , ρjt , Zjt ) = $0.10×wR (Zjt )−$0.05×1 {ρjt = View, mit 6= m∅ }−$0.50×ψ R (mit , ρjt , Zjt ).
While the first fifteen rounds exactly follow the above timeline, in the second half of each
session we introduce a strategy method to collect richer strategic choices.17 Instead of showing
subjects the send cost cSit and choosing whether or not they wish to send the provisional message
m̂it at that cost, in the last fifteen rounds we ask them to specify a cutoff cost C it ∈ G below which
they would be willing to send. Similarly, receivers are not informed of their specific reservation
draw ωjt , and are instead asked to specify a reservation cutoff Ωjt ∈ H (a certainty equivalent)
below which they would choose a draw from Ẑjt (and above which they would choose the realized
reservation ωjt .)

A
B S
Data
from
interactions
in
rounds
1–15
are
therefore
given
by
φ
,
φ
,
c
,
ω
, (Xit , m̂it , mit ) ,
jt
it
it
it

E


A
B S
ρjt , Ijt , Ẑjt , Zjt ; while data from rounds 16–30 are given by φit , φit , cit , ωjt , Xit , m̂it , C it ,

E
ρjt , Ijt , Ẑjt , Ωjt .

15

In the experiment Urn A and B are relabeled as Urn C or Urn D for the receiver subjects. This relabeling is done
with equal probability so receiver j cannot know which urn the sender chose from. For tractability though we will
continue to refer to them as urns A and B rather than urns C and D.
16
Here our parameterization effectively makes the implicit assumption that each receiver is representative of K = 4
final consumers, so that 4 · t = T .
17
For a survey of papers examining (and for the most part supporting) the strategy method relative to direct-response
see Brandts and Charness (2011).
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2.2. Equilibrium Predictions. Our environment is a form of “cheap-talk.” Though there are
costs for sending and receiving messages, there are no differential costs across the different informative messages. As such, in all of our environments there will be a “babbling” equilibrium
where meaningless messages are selected and sent only for negative costs, and where receivers
do not view the resulting messages. The babbling outcome reflects the worst case for information
transfer, a coordination on zero information being conveyed. However, in three of our treatments
there is the theoretical possibility of coordinating on more-informative outcomes. Given the parameterizations outlined above, Table 1 provides predictions for the main economic variables in
the most-informative PBE (miPBE, where we enforce a symmetry restriction over the urns) in each
treatment.18
Before diving into the predictions, we should note here our interpretation for the theory. While
the equilibrium calculations are undoubtedly complex, the choices in our game are relatively simple. For senders: given an easy-to-interpret signal, what information would you send, and at what
cost to yourself would you actually send it? For receivers: will you view a message at a fixed cost;
given your information which urn do you prefer, and what is your valuation for it? As with many
models we do not expect subjects’ behavior to stem from introspective calculations of the best
responses given stated probability distributions and conjectures on the distributions of others play.
Instead we see the miPBE here as an “as if” for the upper-bound outcomes in our four treatments
given enough time to learn responses with favorable initial play.
The first-order difference in behavior across the Baseline and Receiver miPBEs is the rate at


which senders provide information, Pr µ? X, x, cS ∈ M , given in the Rating Provision row
in Table 1. In the Baseline, information is provided approximately a third of the time (up to
costs of approximately $0.10) while in the Receiver case provision is almost complete (at costs
in excess of $2). The extent to which decision-relevant information is exchanged is measured by
Υ which is given in the Info. Efficiency row.19 This efficiency measure examines the expected
receiver outcome wR (Z) in the equilibrium measured relative to the expected outcome under no
communication W , which is then normalized by W − W , the difference between the expected
outcomes under perfect and no information exchange.
Given selection of miPBE, communication generates 36.3 percent efficiency in the Baseline,
which increases to 98.1 percent in the Receiver treatment. However, gains in information efficiency
do not come for free in the Receiver treatment. While the average sender is much better off in the
18

A full specification of an equilibrium here is a tuple < µ? , (ρ? , ζ ? ) >: a message strategy µ? : {A, B} × Θ × G →
M ∪ {m∅ } for the sender (where µ? (x, X, cS ) take into account the signal draw and cost of sending; and for the
receiver a viewing strategy ρ? ∈ {View, Not} and a final choice rule ζ ? : I × H → {A, B, R} (where ζ ? (I, ω) takes
into account the precise information set I ∈ I and the reservation). More detailed derivations are relegated to the
appendix, as well as a comparable prediction table formulated under a risk-averse preference.
19
For both the Baseline and Receiver treatments, the most-informative equilibrium involves sending a single rating 1X
for all sender types (X, x) with x ≤ 50 and sending the ratings 2X through 5X for the signals x in the ranges 51–61,
62–73, 74–86, and 87–100, respectively.
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TABLE 1. Most-Informative Risk-Neutral Equilibrium Predictions
Baseline (B) Receiver (R) Marketplace Producer (P) Comp. Static
(M)
Alignment
Distinct Ratings
Rating Provision
Info. Efficiency, Υ
Rec. Welfare, ΥR

Cardinal
10
0.346
36.3%
34.1%

Cardinal
10
0.980
98.1%
30.6%

Ordinal
2
0.934
87.6%
81.7%

None
0/Babbling
0.304
0.0%
0.0%

RMBP
RMBP
MBRP

0.0
0.0%
-6.3%

B∼R∼MP
BRMP
BMRP

Conditional on rating
View Rate,
Info. Efficiency Υ
Rec. Welfare ΥR

1.0
106.6%†
100.4%†

1.0
100.3%†
31.4%

1.0
93.9%
87.6%

Note: †-There are selection effects over quality through the sender’s decision to provide a rating or not, where senders
are more likely to send given a high signal. Because of this the efficiency and receiver welfare conditional on no rating
can be negative, while they can exceed 100 percent conditional on provision.

most-informative Receiver equilibrium than in the Baseline, the provision subsidy has to be paid
for by receivers. Even though the Receiver treatment increases total efficiency, once we account for
the payment they make to the sender, receivers actually fare worse in this setting than the Baseline.
This is illustrated by the Rec. Welfare row in Table 1, which modifies the efficiency measure ΥR to
account for the incurred costs of communication to the receiver. Our receiver welfare measure uses
the receiver’s expected payoff, incorporating the expected costs of the transfer, where, as above,
we normalize the outcome relative to those with perfect costless messaging and zero-information
transfer.
The raw cost to view a message in our experiment is cR = $0.05, which represents a 6.3
percent efficiency penalty if incurred with certainty. In the Baseline prediction, where ratings are
provided approximately a third of the time, the presence of a cost results in receiver welfare of
34.1 percent. However, there is a much larger drop in the Receiver treatment, with receiver welfare
falling to just 30.6 percent. There are two reasons for this larger drop: First, ratings are predicted
to be provided at much higher rates so acquisition costs are incurred more often. Second, and the
quantitatively larger force, much of the receiver’s gain from increased information is transferred
to the sender through the incentive payment t. In fact, despite a large increase in total efficiency,
receivers’ final outcomes are inferior to the most-informative Baseline prediction. Taken in context
with the presence of multiple equilibria in the Baseline and Receiver institutions, one effect of the
11

reduced receiver welfare may be to make coordination on the informative equilibria riskier when
the receivers are the ones footing the bill.20
In contrast with the above two environments where the sender would fully reveal the cardinal
level of her signal if it were free to do so, the Marketplace setting’s conditional transfer removes
some of the alignment between the sender and receiver over the available information. Instead,
the two agents share a conditional alignment only over which of the two products is ordinally
better, and have no shared interests over WTP. The Marketplace miPBE uses just two effective
messages from the ten available. In equilibrium, sent messages are equivalent to making the statement “Given my information, I expect A (B) to be better choice for you than B (A),”21 which can be
achieved by sending a five-rating on the sampled urn whenever the signal is better than expected
(x > 50) and a five-rating on the unsampled urn otherwise. Though less useful than the ratings in
the settings with fully aligned interest, this binary statement is still informative, and is predicted
to increase willingness to pay. A receiver viewing a rating of 5Y in the Marketplace miPBE will
choose the product Y for all reservation values ω < 60, and not to buy whenever ω ≥ 60.22
Recall that the sender’s incentive payment in the Marketplace treatment is conditioned on receivers choosing either one of the two products. The expected subsidy to a sender who provides a
rating J is Pr {z 6= R} · T , which is smaller than the Receiver miPBE where the full payment is
received with probability one.23 This drop in the expected incentive reduces provision relative to
the Receiver treatment. The 87.6 percent information efficiency in Marketplace is lower than the
Receiver case—through reduced provision and coarser revealed information—but still represents
a substantial improvement on the Baseline. For receivers though, because they are not paying for
the incentive payment, they share more of the gains from increased efficiency. The 81.7 percent
receiver welfare is the highest within our four treatments. Indeed, both senders and receivers do
better than the Baseline, despite the misalignment introduced over WTP.
Finally, the Producer treatment only has a babbling equilibrium outcome as the sender and
receiver share no ex ante interests over information transmission. Though ratings are still provided
(for negative costs cS ) receivers choose not to view them in equilibrium and the ratings convey
no useful information. Because the sender incentive is large and conditioned on the sales of a
20

Assuming a benign form of the babbling equilibrium (where less harmful on miscoordination 1X -ratings are sent for
cS < 0), we consider a coordination problem for receivers between the babbling and the miPBE outcomes. Receivers
in Baseline will choose to view whenever they place more than a 0.16 probability on senders coordination on the
miPBE. In contrast, in the Receiver treatment, the additional cost of viewing means receivers must place more than
0.69 probability on the miPBE, and so receiver-coordination on not-viewing/babbling is risk dominant.

21
The equilibrium message behavior can be characterized by a rating strategy such as µ X, x, cS = 5Y , where
Y = X for x > 50 and Y 6= X when x ≤ 50, sent whenever the provision cost cS is not too large.
22
The exact choice stems from the expected quality of urn Y given the message 5Y being 5/8θ̄ + 3/8E (x |x > 50 ) =
59.875. Note that unlike the previous cases, the rating here is also informative about the other urn Y 0 6= Y , which has
an expected quality of 41.125.
23
In section 4 we come back to thinking through why a Marketplace player might provided such incentives.
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particular product, sender preferences are effectively state independent. Without any common
interests with the sender the receivers cannot view messages as credible in equilibrium. As such,
the Producer incentives are predicted to be counterproductive in the long run, and it is clear that
neither producer A nor B would want to pay for information incentives in equilibrium.
While the equilibrium analysis of the Producer setting indicates the incentive is counterproductive in the long-run, in the short-run such incentives may be quite powerful. If producers deployed
such incentives to senders in secret within the Baseline or Receiver environments it would be possible to substantially increase the same-product sales figures until receivers learned that five-ratings
were largely dishonest. A similar short-run benefit might induce marketplaces to offer secret incentives for marketplace-level incentives, as a five-rating increases the WTP (and therefore sales)
for a credulous receiver. We come back to an experimental comparison of the short- and long-run
incentives in section 4.
3. R ESULTS
Below we present results from sessions conducted at the Pittsburgh Experimental Economics
Laboratory. We used the z-Tree (Fischbacher, 2007) experimental software to collect data from
176 unique subjects across 12 sessions, with 3 sessions per treatment. Subjects were paid for two
randomly selected rounds out of the 30 they played, with average payments per subject of $18.09.
We first outline treatment averages, and test the comparative statics derived from our equilibrium
predictions. We then analyze subject behavior in more detail, and outline the “why” of the results.
3.1. Efficiency. Our main outcome results can be summarized as follows:
Result 1 (Efficiency).
(1) Total information transfer is substantially lower than predicted in all treatments, though
observed behavior matches the best-case equilibrium comparative statics.
(2) Receivers are better off under the Marketplace incentive than the Receiver incentive.
Evidence for the first result is contained in Table 2 which summarizes the experimental data,
where each row provides sample analogs to the predictions in Table 1. While our theory predicts
receivers either always or never view, we additionally include averages for the subsample with
viewed ratings. The first five rows in Table 2 outline unconditional means: i) the rate of provision
by senders; ii) the overall efficiency of the information transfer;24 and iii) the receiver welfare,
which accounts for the expected cost of viewing. The remaining rows report conditional outcomes,
first viewing frequency conditional on a sent rating, and second the efficiency and receiver welfare
conditional on a rating being sent and viewed.
24

All efficiency measures are calculated by a recombinant procedure, matching all receivers against the entire sender
population consistent with the information set. In this way, we integrate out much of the exogenous noise (variation in
xit |mit and cit ) while retaining the observed strategic variation in sender and receiver behavior.
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TABLE 2. Experimental Outcomes
Baseline (S = 46) Receiver (S = 40) Market. (S = 47) Producer (S = 44)

Data

Comparative Static
Theory
(miPBE)

Avg. Std. Err N

MR  P  B

Avg. Std. Err N

RMBP

RMBP

Avg. Std. Err N

RMBP

Avg. Std. Err N

1.0% 3.9%

MBRP M ∼ B  P ∼ R

38.8% 7.9%

?

?

?

M  R∼BP

??

B∼R∼MP

???

?

R  B∼MP

???

BRMP

B∼MP  R

?

BMRP

???

??? ???

17.7% 3.8%

-1.1% 3.9%

51.3% 6.7%

?

28.1% 4.1%

14.1% 3.8%

13.4% 7.9%

??

9.0% 3.9%
-2.9% 4.1%

52.1% 7.6%

58.4% 7.6% 374 82.4% 6.3% 539 57.6% 5.2% 804 45.1% 7.0% 443

Conditional on viewed rating

0.735 0.020 509 0.742 0.016 726 0.899 0.010 894 0.688 0.018 644

Conditional on provided rating

0.369 0.013 1380 0.605 0.014 1200 0.634 0.013 1410 0.488 0.014 1320

Info. Efficiency
7.3% 3.8%

Provision
Rec. Welfare

Viewing

Info. Efficiency
Rec. Welfare

Note: Tests are derived from Wald tests after regression (probit) results for Efficiency/Welfare (Provision/Viewing/Sales decisions) on treatment dummies. The
???
?? ?
relationship A  B (,  ) represent rejection of mean equality for treatments A and B with the one sided alternative A>B at 99 percent confidence (95, 90
percent confidence, respectively). The relationship A∼B reflects failure to reject at 90 percent confidence. We list binary pairs of tests according to the data
averages; comparative static relationships are ordered by the size of the effects, and are transitive except for Inf. Efficiency given a viewed rating where B∼V.
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Efficiency of information transfer. Ordinally, unconditional efficiency matches the comparative
statics predicted by theory. At one end, the Receiver incentive produces the most information
transfer, with significantly greater efficiency than any other treatment. The Producer treatment
meanwhile has the lowest information transfer, with an average efficiency just below zero. Between
these two extremes are the Marketplace and Baseline treatments, in line with their theoretical
rankings. However, once we compare the cardinal levels in Table 1 and 2, we see quantitatively
large differences. The Receiver and Marketplace treatments theoretically allow for efficiency levels
close to the frictionless upper bound, but in realization we end up with just a quarter of the total
efficiency. One reason for the drop is the lower than predicted rates of provision and viewing
in Receiver and Marketplace. To control for this difference we instead look at the information
efficiency conditional on a provided and viewed message. Examining this subsample in Table
2 we do see a much larger efficiency increase. Receiver and Producer are again the best and
worst treatments, respectively. For Receiver we observe an average efficiency of 82 percent of the
upper bound, while even the Producer treatment is conveying useful information, with 45 percent
efficiency.
Conditional on a viewed rating, Baseline fares significantly worse than Receiver, where the
best-case theory predicts comparable levels. Instead, we observe a large and significant efficiency
gap between Receiver and Baseline, and no significant difference between Marketplace and Baseline. Instead of the 94 percent efficiency possible after an equilibrium rating is provided, we
observe just 58 percent in Marketplace.

Receiver outcomes. For the three treatments where receivers do not pay any additional amount to
the sender, the immediate effect of viewing a rating is the same: the receiver pays a 6.3 percent
efficiency penalty due to the cost of viewing. However, in the Receiver treatment, the transfer
to senders reduces receivers’ share of the information surplus substantially— with a 69 percent
penalty to efficiency on viewing. Despite this large cost, receiver welfare conditional on viewing
is still positive. Net of costs, receivers who view a rating improve their outcomes relative to their
expected outcome with no sender present in the game.
The most important result with regard to receiver outcomes is that their maximum payoffs are
achieved in the Marketplace treatment. Conditional on a viewed rating, the receiver welfare row
of Table 2 shows that receivers do just as well in the Baseline and Marketplace treatments, so the
effect of misalignment over WTP in the Marketplace incentive is small. In other words, trading off
some quality in the information provided in order to subsidize ratings leads to offsetting increases
in quantity. The unconditional receiver welfare figures therefore attain a maximum in Marketplace,
however, the overall difference in receiver welfare compared to the Baseline is only marginally
significant.
15

TABLE 3. Decision to send a rating.

Signals:
x, Low

Baseline

Receiver

Marketplace

Producer

Provision Cutoff

Provision Cutoff

Provision Cutoff

Provision Cutoff

0.344 ???$0.069 ??
(0.019)

x, Average

0.337

(0.031)

$0.078

???

(0.019)

x, High

0.422

$0.144

(0.018)

Costs:
cit ≤ 0

(0.030)

0.977 ???
(0.008)

Cost

∂
( ∂c
)

-0.469
(0.093)

(0.041)
??

(0.031)
???

0.563 ???$0.646 ???
0.556

(0.084)

$0.634

???

(0.041)
???

0.691

$0.828

(0.039)

(0.084)

0.999
-0.333

0.627

(0.090)

$0.750

???

(0.036)
???

0.716

$0.867

(0.033)

(0.090)

(0.095)

-0.327
(0.056)

0.481

(6.4)

$0.315 ???

???

(0.027)
???

0.563

(6.4)

$0.598 ???

???

(0.030)

(6.4)

0.982 ???

(0.004)
???

0.396 ???$0.237 ???
(0.027)

???

(0.090)
???

0.993

(0.001)
???

(0.036)
???

(0.084)
???

0.572 ???$0.684 ???

(0.007)
???

-0.567 ???
(0.043)

Note: Results for Sent specifications are recovered using a random-effects probit model on the binary dependent
variable 1 {mit 6= m∅ }it ,whether a rating was sent; results for Cutoff specifications from a random-effect least squares
model with dependent variable C it , the specified cost cutoff to send. All variables are predicted levels for dummy
conditions, and the marginal effect of a one-dollar increase in rating cost from zero. Standard errors on the predicted
levels/marginal effects are in parentheses where stars represent significance relative to a null at the babbling provision
level (0.306/$0.00 with full provision for negative costs) at: ??? -99 percent confidence; ?? -95 percent confidence; and
?
-90 percent confidence.

3.2. Sender Behavior. We now move to an analysis of sender and receiver behavior. Mirroring
the sequential nature of the experiment, we first examine senders, analyzing their behavior in the
same order in which they made choices. Sender behavior is first summarized in our second result,
then discussed in detail below.
Result 2 (Sender Behavior).
(1) Senders’ choices respond on the extensive and intensive margins as predicted by theory,
though with a smaller response than predicted on the intensive margin.
(2) Sender’s with very positive information are more likely to provide a rating in all four settings.
(3) Total information provided is largest under the Receiver and Marketplace incentives, and
smallest under the Producer incentive.
Incentives increase provision. The differing incentive structures heavily influence the extensive
margin, substantially increasing the number of ratings sent. The Provision row of Table 2 indicates
significant treatment variation over the frequency with which ratings are sent, ranging from just
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over one-third of the time in the Baseline, just under half the time in Producer, and almost twothirds of the time in the Receiver and Marketplace treatments. Offering incentives to rate products
increases the quantity of ratings, with all three incentive schemes generating significantly more
ratings than the Baseline. Table 3 provides estimation results indicating the factors that influence
the decision to provide a rating. For each treatment we provide two regressions. The first is a
random-effects probit on the decision to send, where the right-hand-side variables are dummies
for low, average and high signal draws ( xit ≤ 33, 33 < xit < 67 and 67 ≤ xit , respectively), a
dummy for a non-positive rating cost (cSit ≤ 0 ), and the actual cost of rating when it is positive
(cSit ). The second, using the cutoff-strategy data from the last 15 rounds, provides results from a
random-effects panel estimate, regressing the specified cost cutoff on the same three signal-quality
dummies. Taking both specifications together, the table provides the estimated rating frequencies
and cost cutoffs for signals drawn in each quality region, alongside the predicted rating frequencies
given a negative rating cost, and the marginal effect on rating from increasing the sender’s cost from
zero.25
Senders in all treatments are sensitive to their signal, with a rating more likely to be provided
following a good draw, but the size of the effect is strongest in the incentivized environments. In
Baseline, going from a low draw to a high draw increases the likelihood of rating by 6.7 percentage
points, and the send cutoff by 7.5 cents. This almost doubles for the Receiver treatment, with a
12.8 percentage point increase for a high draw, where the specified cutoffs differ by 18 cents. In
both the Baseline and Receiver the effect of increased provision is only significant when the draw
is high. However, in the Marketplace and Baseline treatments there are significant increases in
rating frequency from low draws to average, and from average draws to high. The final two rows
of Table 3 show that subjects are sensitive to the cost of rating, with subjects overwhelmingly
choosing to rate following a negative rating cost, and exhibiting a large and significant decrease in
rating frequency as costs rise.
Incentives distort information provided. Having identified the effect of incentives on the extensive
margin, we now focus on the intensive margin, specifically the prevalence of dishonest ratings.
We say that a rating is dishonest if it satisfies any of three conditions: i) Overstatements, a positive
rating (a four or five) on the drawn urn X for a low-quality signal (x ≤ 50); ii) Understatements,
a negative rating (a one or two) on urn X for a high-quality signal (x > 50); or iii) Other Urn, any
rating where the rated urn Y is not the urn X sampled by the sender. We then measure the extent
to which the three incentivized treatments have different rates of dishonesty when compared to the
Baseline. Table 4 summarizes the dishonesty over both the initially selected ratings and those that
were ultimately sent. We focus on the last 15 rounds where subjects have already had experience
25

In the three incentivized treatments the majority of the variation in provision is between subject through the rating
costs. In the appendix we illustrate variation in the subject-level averages for the rate of provision, and the specified
send-cost cutoff (Figure 4).
17

TABLE 4. Frequency of each type of dishonesty (last 15 rounds)
Baseline
Chosen
Ratings

Sent
Ratings

Receiver

Marketplace

Producer

Overstatement
Understatement
Other Urn

0.023
0.039
0.012

0.035 ?
0.003 ???
0.000 ???

0.079 ???
0.011 ???
0.043 ???

0.147 ???
0.027
0.064 ???

Any lie

0.074

0.038 ???

0.133 ???

0.238 ???

Overstatement
Understatement
Other Urn

0.024
0.028
0.016

0.036
0.003 ???
0.000 ???

0.055 ???
0.013 ?
0.035 ???

0.158 ???
0.029
0.065 ???

Any lie

0.069

0.039 ??

0.103 ???

0.252 ???

Note: Confidence levels from two-sided binomial test of each treatment mean against null of same dishonesty as
Baseline: ??? -99 percent; ?? -95 percent; ? -90 percent.

with the rating environment, so that we can be more confident that observed behavior is dishonesty
rather than simply initial miscoordination on the meaning of each rating (though results are similar
for the entire sample).
While incentives to exaggerate an urn’s quality exist in both the Marketplace and Producer
treatments, overstatements are much more common in the Producer treatment. Dishonesty with
respect to which urn is rated is also substantial in both of the misaligned environments. In the
Marketplace treatment, ratings sent for the unobserved urn are most often favorable fours and fives,
while in the Producer treatment they are overwhelmingly negative, most often ones. Rather than
attempt to influence the receiver’s WTP with an overstatement on the incentivized product—which
we will later show is only marginally effective—some senders in Producer use their rating to
influence the receiver’s choice between products through a negative rating on the unsampled urn.26
Though the dishonesty results do indicate significant changes across treatments, the levels of
dishonesty in the misaligned treatments are low in comparison to theory—which is a common
finding in the experimental literature.27 Across all four treatments, the majority of provided information is honest—greater than three quarters of ratings in all treatments.
Efficiency given sender behavior. Finally, we ask how much information in total is being transmitted in each treatment. What is the change in informational content due to dishonesty? Given
the observed accuracy and frequency of ratings, what is the attainable efficiency? To answer these
questions we construct the empirical best response for receivers, given observed sender outcomes.
26

As an example of this type of rating dishonesty, Italian antitrust authorities fined the website TripAdvisor for a series
of false negative reviews for hotels (“TripAdvisor fined $600,000 by Italian Anti-Trust”, Associated Press, Dec. 22,
2014) while promoting its reviews as “authentic and genuine.”
27
See Gneezy (2005) for a simple experimental identification of this, and Kartik (2009) for a theoretical treatment.
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TABLE 5. Possible Efficiency Given Sender Behavior
Variable

Baseline Receiver Marketplace Producer

Info. efficiency

32.2%

54.1%

48.5%

21.3%

Info. efficiency | rating sent
Info. efficiency | no rating sent

91.0%
-2.2%

96.1%
-10.1%

88.2%
-20.2%

62.2%
-17.8%

Rec. welfare | rating sent, not viewed
Rec. welfare | rating sent and viewed

9.2%
84.7%

5.8%
27.1%

9.0%
82.0%

13.3%
56.0%

Note: Information efficiency possible, is calculated where receivers use the risk-neutral empirical best response with
accurate beliefs on the empirical expectation of quality for each urn, given their information set.

The first row in Table 5 indicates the maximum efficiency possible given sender behavior.28 The
second and third rows break out the sample into the efficiency possible with and without a rating.
Finally, the last two rows hold constant the provision of a rating, but examine the receiver welfare
(inclusive of viewing costs and payments to senders) from viewing the rating or choosing not to
view. A comparison of the bottom two rows therefore indicates whether a best-responding receiver
should view the rating or not.
When a rating is provided, the attainable efficiency levels are very high—over 90 percent of that
attainable if receivers perfectly observed the sender’s draw from the urn in Baseline and Receiver,
and just under that in Marketplace. Though there is a substantial drop off in the Producer treatment,
the total information content is still substantial.29
3.3. Receiver Behavior. We now turn to the other side of the market, and ask how receivers
respond to sender behavior. Our main results on receiver behavior are summarized as:
Result 3 (Receiver Behavior).
(1) Receivers are less likely to acquire information when the sender’s preference is completely
misaligned in Producer, and most likely to acquire under the partial alignment of Marketplace.
(2) Viewed ratings have substantial effects on the choice between products in all four treatments.
(3) In all treatments except Producer a positive rating increases the likelihood of a sale.
28

The expected efficiency given sender’s behavior for a best-responding receiver is calculated as Υ̂S =
hP

i
R
1
P̂r
{m}
·
max
{ν̂
(m)
,
ν̂
(m)
,
ω}
dH(ω)
−
W
, where the best-response action is
A
B
m∈M∪{m∅ }
W −W
simply to choose the option with the highest expected outcome given the information available m and the reservation
ω. Similar calculations lead to estimates for the attainable efficiency (and receiver welfare) conditioned on receiving a
rating or not.
29
The size of the provision selection effect in each treatment can be calculated by comparing the row in which no
rating was sent to that in which a rating was sent but not viewed.
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Viewing Ratings. Conditional on a sender providing a rating, the receiver’s first decision is whether
or not to view that rating. In three of the treatments viewing incurs a cost $0.05, while in the Receiver treatment the effective viewing cost is $0.55. Conditional on a provided rating, the fraction
of rounds where receivers choose to view and incur the acquisition cost is given in the View Rate
row of Table 2. Sent ratings are equally likely to be viewed in the Baseline and Receiver treatments.
Relative to the Baseline, ratings are more likely to be viewed in the Marketplace treatment, and less
likely to be viewed in the Producer treatment. Broadly speaking, we see that ratings are likely to
be viewed in all treatments, however there are two behaviors worth emphasizing. First we see similar viewing rates in Baseline and Receiver, despite the much higher cost of viewing in Receiver.
Second, the viewing rate in Producer, while lower than any of the other treatments, is much higher
than predicted by theory, with well-over half of receivers choosing to view. This discrepancy relative to the theory can be explained by inspecting Table 5, where we showed substantial information
provision in Producer. In fact, given the difference in receiver outcomes between viewing and not
viewing a message, the more remarkable feature of the behavior here is that more receivers do not
choose to view in Producer. Relative to the Receiver treatment, there is more to gain from viewing
a message relative to the costs. As such, the data is indicative of increased wariness by receivers
when the sender is known to have fully misaligned incentives.
Product Choice. After deciding whether to view, the receiver next selects one of the two urns,
representing which of the two products they would choose if they do not select the outside option.
Receivers at this point differ in their information sets, either knowing the specific rating sent for one
of the two urns; knowing that a rating was provided, but they chose not to view it; or knowing that
no rating was sent. Accounting for symmetry across the urns leads to seven distinct information
sets in each treatment—the five rating values, not viewing the rating, and no rating sent.
Looking only at those receivers who are provided with a rating, we use random-effect probits
to estimate the likelihood that the receiver chooses the rated urn rather than the unrated urn. Table
6(A) shows that receivers overwhelmingly choose urns rated four or five, and avoid those rated one
or two. The intermediate rating of three leads to just over a third of subjects choosing the rated
urn. For those who choose not to view a sent rating, the fraction choosing the rated urn is not
significantly different from 12 .30
While Table 6(A) indicates which of the urns is chosen after rating, Table 6(B) completes the
picture by indicating the WTP for the selected urn. Here we look at the final choice between the
selected urn and the outside option. Similar to our analysis of the sender’s provision decision, we
break our estimation into two parts, the first over the entire data, and the second over just the last
fifteen rounds of the experiment using the elicited WTP cutoffs.
30

However, this is mechanical, as subjects who do not view the rating do not know which urn was rated, and the
interface randomly locates the two urns on their screen, so there is no possibility of coordination on urn location
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TABLE 6. Receiver behavior.
( A ) Probability of selecting rated product

Baseline Receiver Marketplace Producer
???

m= 1 or 2

0.059
(0.019)

(0.008)

m= 3

0.413

0.362

m= 4 or 5

0.973

(0.057)

0.014

???

0.083

???

0.378

???

0.968

0.079

???

0.338

???

0.981

(0.018)

(0.049)
???

???

(0.025)

(0.041)

0.981

???

???

(0.059)

(0.014)

(0.009)

(0.009)

(0.08)

Not viewed 0.504

0.492

0.491

0.493

(0.016)

(0.023)

(0.022)

(0.017)

???

( B ) Choice to buy selected product

Baseline

Receiver

Marketplace

Producer

Buy

WTP

Buy

WTP

Buy

WTP

Buy

WTP

m= 1 or 2 0.756

49.68

0.745

49.86

0.764

53.73

0.801

52.98

(1.96)

(0.033)

(1.93)

(0.029)

(2.18)

(0.039)

(2.54)

50.51

0.724

46.83

(2.47)

(0.057)

(0.036)

m= 3

0.691

51.82

0.808

52.38

0.838

(0.055)

(2.34)

(0.040)

(2.24)

(0.032)

m= 4 or 5 0.856

???

59.24
(1.99)

(0.021)

(1.85)

(0.022)

??

49.62

0.762

48.93

0.656

(0.030)

Not viewed 0.646
(0.043)

No rating 0.762
(0.016)

???

0.895

???

61.31

???

0.805

???

58.26
(2.01)

(0.026)

(2.28)

?

50.97

0.696

47.56

(2.12)

(0.034)

(2.13)

(0.055)

(3.46)

51.20

0.721

49.06

0.773

53.75

(1.47)

(0.022)

(1.65)

(0.021)

(1.97)

???

(3.05)

??

?

0.802

??

52.04

(0.036)

(2.49)

0.765

49.47

(0.019)

(2.11)

Note: For Table 6(A) the probability of product choice Ẑ being the rated product Y is derived from a random-effect
probit estimate. For Table 6(B): Buy probability is the estimate of Pr {Z 6= R |I }, derived from a random-effect probit
estimate for each information set I. WTP figures are estimate for E Ω̄ |I , which are derived from a random-effects
panel estimate. Standard errors on all probabilities/cutoffs are in parentheses; stars represent significant differences
from babbling levels ( 21 for product choices, 0.75 for the sales rate, and 50.5 for the reservation cutoffs) at: ??? -99
percent confidence; ?? -95 percent confidence; and ? -90 percent confidence.

The Buy columns reflect the rate at which the selected urn is chosen over the outside option,
which we assess with a random-effects probit. In contrast, the cutoff estimates reflect the predicted
reservation cutoff, obtained using a random-effects panel estimate. Predicted levels are indicated
for the following receiver types: i) viewed a negative rating of one or two; ii) viewed the intermediate rating of three; iii) viewed a positive rating of four or five; iv) was provided a rating but did
not view; and v) was not provided with a rating.
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The WTP regressions, which use data from the last half of the experiment only, show a reservation cutoff close to the unconditional expected quality of θ̄ = 50.5 following a positive rating in
Producer. In other words, receivers in the Producer treatment seem to learn not to react to positive
ratings with increased WTP. Though receivers eventually ignore favorable Producer-based ratings
when deciding whether to participate in the market (i.e., whether to buy any product), ratings are
still somewhat persuasive, as they continue to have a strong effect on the choice between products.

4. D ISCUSSION : T HIRD PARTIES AND T HE S TABILITY OF R ATING I NCENTIVES
Our analysis so far has focused on how outcomes relate to the consumers in our experimental
environment, the sender and receiver of information. However, in motivating our incentives there
are two other interested parties: the marketplace, that aims to maximize total sales across all products; and the producer whose product was sampled by the sender, and aims to maximize sales of
their particular product. In this section we show that, taking the goals of these third parties into
account, that Marketplace is the most-attractive long-run incentive. We summarize our analysis
here, and provide supporting evidence below:
Result 4.
(1) Across a large range of outside-option distributions, the Marketplace incentive maximizes
outcomes both for the marketplace and producer third parties.
(2) Relative to the Baseline and Receiver setting, Marketplace is more stable to the covert
introduction of a Producer incentive.
We start by showing that across a range of parameterizations the Marketplace incentive is preferred both by the marketplaces that sell competing products, but also by the particular product
manufacturer the sender has information on (represented by the urn X in our experiment). The results outlined in the previous section were tied to the specific parameterizations used in our experiments. However, as we collected willingness to pay information in the last half of our experiments,
we can use this data to extrapolate our results. Of particular importance for the third parties we
consider is the reservation distribution H(ω), which affects the number of receivers who are likely
to buy one of the two products even without information, and those who are unlikely to buy even
with a very positive rating. We now show that the receiver WTP data suggests the Marketplace
incentives are beneficial to both third parties for a large range of reservation distributions.
We parameterize a family of variance-preserving beta distributions {Hσ (ω)} that vary the ex.
pected reservation σ, and which intersects with our experimental parameterization at σ = 100
3
Using the WTP data and behavioral elasticities estimated across treatments, we calculate the total
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F IGURE 1. Percentage Point Sales Difference from Baseline under reservation Hσ (ω)
sales and same-product sales under the counterfactual distribution Hσ (ω), which we graph as the
difference from the Baseline amounts in Figures 1(A) and 1(B).31
Figure 1(A) indicates that across a broad range of possible reservation distributions, the Marketplace treatment generates more total sales than any of the other incentives. Quantitatively, the
marketplace benefits more when the expected reservation is higher. This behavior is in contrast
with the Receiver environment, which has little effect at increasing total sales over the Baseline
across the range of σ, and the Producer environment, which has a mostly negative effect for the
marketplace.
Figure 1(B) shows Marketplace is also superior in the long-run for generating same-product
sales. For the specific producer the sender has information on, the Producer incentive only outperforms Marketplace when expected reservations are very low. The reasoning for this can be seen by
re-examining receiver reactions in Table 6. The Producer incentive is very effective at changing
the consumer’s preferred product from the two, but bad at increasing their willingness to pay. As
such, the incentive is most effective when most consumers will buy one of the two products regardless of the information provided. In contrast, the Producer incentive will be ineffective if the
receiver needs to be convinced of a product’s absolute quality.
In the long run the Marketplace incentive is therefore superior for both third parties across a
wide variety of outside-option distributions when receivers are fully aware of the incentives provided. However, third parties may also benefit substantially in the short run by covertly introducing
incentives. Our next counterfactual examines the extent to which third parties benefit in the short
run by offering incentive B to senders where receivers believe they are offered incentive A.32 As an
31

Full details of the counterfactual model are provided in Appendix B. The main features of the model are that hold
constant the observed message distribution (conditional on the signal x) and the receiver’s willingness to pay (conditional on each observed message), and use experimental variation in the environments to estimate subjects’ provision
and viewing elasticities with respect to changes in the expected benefits of sending and viewing, respectively.
32
The Federal Trade Commission has recently cracked down on precisely this behavior (“FTC Staff Reminds Influencers and Brands to Clearly Disclose Relationship”, Federal Trade Commission, April 19, 2017). Producers can also
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TABLE 7. Short-run effects
( B ) Same-Product Sales Difference

( A ) Total Sales Difference

Sender Incentive

Sender Incentive

Base.

Rec.

Mkt.

Prod.

Base. –
Receiver Rec. -0.8%
Incentive Mkt. 1.2%
Prod, -0.1%

0.1%
–
0.2%
0.6%

0.3%
0.4%
–
0.4%

0.5%
0.1%
0.8%
–

Base.

Rec.

Mkt.

Prod.

Base. –
-0.7% 1.7%
Rec. 0.0%
–
3.0%
Mkt. -2.0% -2.4%
–
Prod. -4.8% -4.2% -1.8%

4.3%
5.6%
2.4%
–

Note: Values show percentage point changes in the frequency of sales when receivers under the row treatment face
senders from the column treatment relative to the frequency when both sender and receiver are in the row treatment.

approximation for the short-run benefits, we combine the provision and ratings from one treatment
with the viewing and final choice behavior from another. That is, fixing the receiver response in
treatment A, we assess the third-party sale rates Π(A, B) when matched to the sender behavior in
treatment B.33 The short-run sales effect is then calculated as ∆Π(A, B) = Π(A, B) − Π(A, A).
Given the receiver’s perceived environment A, Table 7 indicates the change ∆Π(A, B) for both
total and same-product sales when the sender’s environment is covertly changed to B. Using data
from the last ten rounds of the experiment we assess the rating distributions, view rates, and the
relevant sales rates conditional on a viewed rating in all four treatments. The total sales effects are
small across each comparison, and so we conclude that short-run considerations by the marketplace
(at the experimental parameterization) are unlikely to trump the long-run considerations. However,
we do see much stronger effects when examining same-product sales. Secretly offering senders a
Producer incentive when receivers believe they are in the Baseline or Receiver environment leads
to substantial sales increases (a 12 and 16 percent relative sales increase, respectively).
In contrast, the introduction of Producer-type incentives into the Marketplace environment
generates a much smaller benefit, as receivers are already more suspicious of positive ratings,
though the overall effect is still a 6 percent relative increase in sales volume. Combined with the
results from our counterfactual over the long-run effects, we can conclude that Marketplace is the
most-stable of the informative incentive structures.34 Long-run profits to specific manufacturers
are reduced if they introduce product-specific incentives to a Marketplace environment, which
may serve to offset the short-run gains. In contrast, for the Baseline and Receiver environments
go one step further, avoid paying any incentives and simply fraudulently rate their own products, as in Mayzlin et al.
(2014).
33
One subtlety in this counterfactual is that senders believe receivers are aware of the incentives they are being offered.
Our approximation therefore assumes that if senders were aware of the asymmetries they would not change their
messaging behavior.
34
Producer is the most stable of the four, but also the most inefficient.
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the long-run same-product sales are increased through the introduction of Producer incentives, and
there are much larger short-run gains from their covert introduction.
5. C ONCLUSION
The effectiveness of information exchange is determined not only by the quality or accuracy
of information provided, but also the quantity. A persistent problem in many information environments is one of underprovision, where parties with socially useful information fail to provide it.
To solve this problem, those with relevant information can be incentivized to provide it to others.
However the party offering incentives can heavily influence the total benefits from information,
and how they are distributed. By examining both the extensive (quantity) and intensive (quality)
margins of information transfer under four qualitatively different incentive structures, we show
that all parties may actually benefit from incentives that increase the quantity at the cost of a slight
decrease in quality.
Our Receiver environment maintains full alignment-of-interest between senders and receivers,
with consumers who provide information being compensated by those using the information. This
leads to a large increase in the quantity of information. However, this environment is not the
optimal arrangement for the consumers making use of information, as the burden of paying for it
can erode much of the benefits. The best outcome for receivers is instead found in our Marketplace
incentive, which maintains only partial alignment-of-interests between the senders and receivers,
offering a reward to senders whenever they generate a sale. This type of sales-contingent incentive
has a corrosive effect on the quality of provided information (both theoretically and in our data),
creating a motivation for informed parties to provide only favorable information. However, ratings
under this incentive are still useful to consumers, as they truthfully reveal an ordinal feature: which
of the competing products is better. Consumers, marketplaces, and producers are all potentially
better off thanks to a trade-off between quality and quantity.
Our last incentive shows that trading off too much alignment-of-interest leads to sub-optimal
results. Theory predicts that when senders are provided with a Producer-driven incentive to generate product-specific sales, the misalignment of interests between sender and receiver is complete
and no information is transmitted. While our experimental data suggests a less extreme outcome, it
is the least efficient of our four environments. Though inefficient, producers do have a clear shortrun motivation to introduce this type of misaligned incentive for referral sales, as the deceptively
favorable recommendations it generates lead to increased sales.
Finally, we use our experimental data to point out another potential benefit for our Marketplace
institution: a little bit of commonly known misalignment can help inoculate the environment from
the introduction of fully misaligned incentives. The Marketplace incentive creates less-credulous
consumers who are not as easily exploited in the short run by secretly introduced Producer payments. Further research will hopefully examine the effects from other important channels excluded
25

from our analysis—in particular reputation, aggregation on multiple sources, and repeated interaction. Nonetheless, our results demonstrate that in a controlled one-shot environment there are
potential benefits from offering incentives that decrease the accuracy of individual sources of information in exchange for an increasing in the total number of available sources.
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A PPENDIX A. F OR O NLINE P UBLICATION : T HEORETICAL F RAMEWORK
In this section we introduce our formal framework. We then introduce the four environments
we will analyze, and provide a discussion of the most-informative equilibria.
To begin constructing our framework we first describe the uninformed consumer’s problem: A
representative consumer R (the receiver, he) faces a choice between two initially symmetric, nondivisible products, product A or product B. The consumer has a unit demand for either product, but
can also choose to purchase neither, and consume an outside option with a privately known value
ω ∈ R, drawn according to a CDF H. If R chooses a product Z ∈ {A, B}, he forgoes his outside
option, and receives a product with some random quality/utility level z ∈ Θ = {θ1 , . . . , θN } ⊂ R.
We denote the outside-option choice as R (as in they choose themselves), so the overall choice set
for the receiver is Z ∈ {A, B, R}, with payoffs given by

z if Z ∈ {A, B}
wR (Z; ω) =
ω otherwise.
The realized product quality z for product Z is governed by a quality control process φZ ∈ ∆Θ, a
lottery over quality levels. The consumer R’s problem is that he has no specific information on the
quality control processes φA and φB for the two products. Though he has a symmetric expectation
on the delivered qualities, this comes from knowledge that each producer’s quality process is an
iid draw from a constellation of processes, Φ = {φ1 , . . . , φL } ⊂ ∆Θ. A producer with the process
φl occurs with prior probability pl and has an expected delivered quality θ̄l := E (z |z ∼ φl ). So
P
without further information, the expected quality of either product is θ̄ = Ll=1 pl · θ̄l .
Without additional information a risk-neutral R will choose to purchase either of the two products when θ̄ > ω, and abstain from a purchase when ω > θ̄. Ex ante, the expected outcome for R
in the absence of any other information is
Z ∞



W = Eω,φA ,φB max ω, θ̄ = H(θ̄) · θ̄ +
ω · dH(ω).
θ̄

The focus of our paper is social-information transmission, the degree to which R’s peers, other
consumers with relevant product experience, will provide information to the marketplace that improves R’s decision making. To this end, we introduce a consumer with product experience S (the
sender, she). The sender’s experience with the product will be fairly natural: she has previously
bought one of the two competing products, X ∈ {A, B}, and received a product of quality level
x ∈ Θ.35 The experienced quality level x provides information on product X’s quality distribution,
φX , so S’s signal (X, x) can be helpful to R’s choice.

35

The environment can be extended to either multiple senders {S1 , S2 , S3 , . . .} who provide simultaneously, or a
i
sequence of players (R0 , R1 , R2 , . . .), where receivers {Rj }j=0 act as sender for Ri+1 .
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Given full information sharing, R updates his prior pl on product X’s process being φl to the
posterior ql (x). The three different choices in {A, B, R} will now be associated with three expected
P
qualities: the product X with expected quality νX (x) := Ll=1 ql (x) · θ̄l ; the unsampled product
X 0 ∈ {A, B} \ {X} at νX 0 (∅) := θ̄; and the outside option at ω.36 A fully informed consumer can
simply choose the best option of the three, where the information exchange has two components:
(i) Helping R discern between the products A and B. Where θ̄ > νX (x) the information
focuses R’s choice on the unsampled product X 0 , and for νX (x) > θ̄ the focal product is
X.
(ii) Discerning when to buy. In those cases where νX (x) > θ̄ the provided information increases R’s WTP, and the set of buyers would be all those with reservations ω < νX (x).
When θ̄ > νX (x), the WTP is unaltered, and the set of buyers is those with reservations
ω < θ̄.
Full exchange of the signal (X, x) provides the upper-bound for information transfer in this environment, where the expected payoff is given by



W := Eω,φA ,φB ,x max ω, νX (x) , θ̄ .
Against these two extremes (full frictionless exchange and no information transfer) we will
consider equilibrium predictions and experimental behavior where information transmission between the consumers has frictions: where the provision of information incurs private costs to the
sender; where the language available to communicate information is limited; and where acquisition
of provided information to the receiver is costly.
Given sender provision costs, a second-best outcome emerges in equilibrium in which consumers, merchants, and the manufacturers of specific products benefit from greater provision. Our
analysis will consider three plausible institutions for increasing provision, and examine equilibrium
predictions and experimental behavior in each regime. Under a particular institution ψ, we will examine the expected gross outcome for receivers, W (ψ) = EwR (Z; ψ), normalized to indicate the
efficiency of information transfer as:
Υ(ψ) =

W (ψ) − W
.
W −W

That is, we measure efficiency as the gain in W (ψ) relative to the individually rational, nocommunication lower bound W , as a fraction of the the maximal information exchange possible
in a frictionless setting, (W − W ).
The full sender-receiver game’s timing is as follows:

36

Given an information set I, we will use the notation νZ (I) := E (z |I ), where expectations are taken over the
process φZ and the realization z ∼ φZ .
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(i) Nature draws a state of the world (φA , φB , cS , ω) where φA and φB are iid draws from a set
of lotteries Φ ⊂ ∆Θ; cS ∈ R is a cost of provision drawn independently from a CDF G;
and ω ∈ H ⊂ R is a reservation, drawn independently from CDF H.
(ii) S observes her send cost cS , and obtains a single draw x from φX , where the initial product
X ∈ {A, B} is selected with equal probability. Given the signal (X, x), her choice is a
rating/message m ∈ M ∪ {m∅ }, where M is a set of meaningful ratings, and m∅ is the
empty message, choosing not to provide. Choosing any m ∈ M incurs the cost cS , while
choosing not to provide, m = m∅ , is free.
(iii) R observes whether there was a provided rating, learning either that {m ∈ M} or that
{m = m∅ } has occurred. If {m ∈ M} he first chooses whether or not to acquire the information, ρ ∈ {View, Not}, incurring a fixed cost cR > 0 only when he views.37
(iv) R observes his private outside option ω, and the precise rating m ∈ M if viewing. He then
makes a choice Z ∈ {A, B, R}, with a realization z from φZ if a product is chosen, and ω
if he selects the reservation.38
Completing the specification of the game over the action choices (m, ρ, Z), S and R’s preferences
are modeled through the net utility functions
uS (m, ρ, Z) = x + α · wR (Z; ω) − cS · 1 {m 6= m∅ } + ψS (m, ρ, Z) · T,
uR (Z, ρ, m) = wR (Z; ω) − cR · 1 {ρ = View, m 6= m∅ } − ψR (m, Z, ρ) · t,
where α > 0 is a preference parameter reflecting a prosocial incentive to help receivers make better
product choices.39 The institution ψ is reflected by a conditional transfer T > 0 to (t > 0 from) the
sender (receiver), conditioned on the specific events indicated through ψS (m, ρ, Z) ∈ {0, 1} (and
ψR (m, ρ, Z) ∈ {0, 1}). The transfer conditions can therefore respond to any of the action choices
made in the game, where our paper will focus on four simple variations.
A pure strategy for the sender is a rating choice µ : {A, B} × Θ × R → M ∪ {m∅ }, a decision
on the rating to send given the signal (X, x) and provision cost cS . The strategy for the receiver
is the tuple (ρ, {ζm }m∈M , ζM , ζ∅ ): a listening decision ρ ∈ {View, Not}, and a product choice
S
ζI : H → ∆ {A, B} ∪ {R} for every possible information set, I ∈ k∈M {m = k} ∪ {m ∈ M} ∪
{m = m∅ }.40 The relevant choices for R are: i) viewing the provided rating m, and responding
with ζm ; ii) knowing that a rating was provided, m ∈ M, but not viewing it, with a response ζM ;
37

The cost cR can be thought of as a small nuisance cost of viewing a rating. Intuitively, this is the small amount of
time and effort it takes to read and comprehend a message.
38
We assume that the realization of ω happens after rating viewing for tractability. The first-order effect from alternating the order is to reduce viewing behavior for those R-types with high reservations.
39
The sender having a lexicographic preference over the receiver outcome, subordinate to her own outcome, would
also suffice for our needs. The required assumption is simply that conditional on sending a non-empty message, the
sender and listening receiver are strongly aligned in interest over the choice Z.
40
We allow for receivers to randomize over the two products A and B to maintain symmetry in the case where no
information is revealed. However the focus of the paper is on how ratings provided by S allow us to break symmetry.
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and iii) knowing that no rating was provided, and responding with ζ∅ . Beliefs at every information
set I for S and R are given by λS (I) and λR (I), which are conditional distributions over the entire
state (φA , φB , cS , ω).
Our solution concept will be Perfect Bayesian equilibrium (PBE), < µ? , ρ? , ζ ? ; λ?S , λ?R >,
where we focus on illustrating the most-informative and least-informative PBEs under two symmetry restrictions. The first restriction is that we restrict attention to symmetric messaging strategies
over the two products, so that there exist complementary messages, and similar quality experiences
(the specific draw x) lead to similar ratings, regardless of the precise sampled product identity
(X = A or X = B). The second restriction is that when agents are indifferent over Z ∈ {A, B},
any resulting ties are broken by an equal randomization between them, where all other strategy
components are pure. The reasoning behind these restrictions is to focus on symmetry between
the two products being broken by ratings ex post, and not through an ex ante coordination on a
particular product.41
Given the description of the environment, we now describe the four environments we will
compare. We first introduce the specific transfer rules ψ, and then provide a qualitative description
of the most-informative equilibrium. The environments we will study are:
Baseline. No conditional transfers, so ψ S (m, ρ, Z) = ψ R (m, ρ, Z) = 0 for all possible action
choices. So long as cR is not too large and there are senders with low enough provisions costs, information transfer is possible in equilibrium.42 However, because the provision cost cS is privately
incurred by senders, there may be draws for which senders do not provide a rating, and select m∅
instead. The main tension in the Baseline environment is on provision, where rational senders
will under-provide information relative to the benefit receivers derive.43 In an environment with
transferable utility where α is small, a Pareto improvement will be possible at costs cS > 0, where
receivers pay for rating provision, which leads us to the next institution.
Receiver Transfer. One simple policy to ameliorate the provision failure in the Baseline is a transfer from the receiver to the sender. Should a non-empty rating be provided, each receiver viewing
a rating instead pays the cost cR + t, where the additional t is a transfer to the sender. Given η representative receivers for every sender and no institutional costs, the transfer received by the sender
is T = η · t. Transfers are conditioned on a receiver viewing the provided rating, so the institution’s
41

Moreover, in our experimental environment, we will explicitly prohibit any such coordination by randomly relabeling A and B between the sender and receiver.
42
A sufficient condition for the second part is that G(0) > 0, so a positive fraction of senders have no cost or enjoy
sending. In the experiment subjects do receive negative cost draws for sending, with the interpretation being that these
senders (net any costs) enjoy sending information to others.
43
In informative equilibria, the decision to provide or not can be characterized by a signal-specific cutoff c? (νX (x); ψ)
where the sender provides a rating in m ∈ M for all cS ≤ c? (νX (x); ψ). The theoretical appendix provides additional
details.
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conditions are

1 if m 6= m and ρ=View,
∅
ψ S (m, ρ, Z) = ψ R (m, ρ, Z) =
0 otherwise.
In any equilibrium where receivers view, the effect is to reduce the cost of provision. When the
drawn cost is cS , the effective cost to the sender is cS − T , with the effective result that the cost
distribution G is shifted to the left by T . So the institution can increase provision, while maintaining alignment in the sender’s incentive. However, there are potential downsides to this incentive.
Transfers of this form do not preclude coordination on low-information outcomes—in particular
babbling equilibria—where the selected ratings have low information content and receivers choose
not to view given the acquisition cost cR . In fact, the equilibrium coordination problem becomes
riskier for receivers than the baseline case. If R miscoordinates on the informative equilibrium
he pays the additional cost t whenever S is coordinating on babbling.44 Even with perfect coordination on informative outcomes, depending on the size of the transfer t, the Receiver institution
alters the distribution of the surplus generated by information transfer, giving more of the gains
to senders. Receivers have an option to view or not, which ensures that they cannot be forced
below the lower-bound expected outcome W . However, if the institution is fixed and the mostinformative equilibrium always selected, receivers can be made worse off in the Receiver setting
than they were in the Baseline. By requiring receivers to pay t to view ratings, receiver’s expected
outcomes can be reduced to the lower bound W . Though this institution can generate greater efficiency than the Baseline, it can also fully redistribute the full surplus, W (Rec.) − W , not just the
additional gain W (Rec.)- W (Base.).

Marketplace Transfer. Our third environment considers an intermediary marketplace player C,
who sells the products A and B, producing a fixed profit when either is sold, but making no profits
when consumers stick with their outside option. The market therefore has an interest in increasing WTP, but is indifferent over which specific product is purchased. To drive sales volume, the
marketplace will be interested in incentivizing senders to generate sales. We assume that the form
of the transfer is conditioned on the sale of either product and a viewed rating.45 For each sale
generated by the sender, the marketplace transfers t, for a total of T = η · t. The condition for the
transfer to the sender is
44

In a babbling equilibrium, ratings in M are still provided whenever cS < 0. However if the same rating mX is
provided at all signals (X, x), then provided ratings have zero information content, and it is a best response not to
view.
45
All of this information is commonly available to marketplaces. Consider an offer where the marketplace provides
previous customers with a unique hyperlink to give to friends when they recommend a product. When purchases are
made using the link, the marketplace observes the sale, and that the link was transmitted between the two.
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1 if m 6= m , ρ=View and Z 6= R,
∅
ψ S (m, ρ, Z) =
0 otherwise,
while ψ R = 0 at all decisions.
Similar to the receiver transfer, this environment has the effect of reducing sender’s provision
costs in informative equilibria, and therefore increasing the quantity of information. However, if
the conditional transfer T is large in relation to the altruism term α, the transfer has a negative effect
on alignment of interest between S and R: they are now only partially aligned. Senders derive a
benefit from receivers buying a product, regardless of their particular reservation ω, though they
are still aligned with the receiver over which product A or B should be chosen. For α small, the
most-informative equilibria restrict senders to providing just two effective ratings, with the ordinal
interpretations “A  B” and “B  A.” The statement that A  B tells the receiver that the
sender’s signal is in {(X, x) |E [wR (A) |x] > E [wR (B) |x ]}.46
Whether receivers are better off here than in the most-informative equilibria in the Baseline
and Receiver environments depends on the specifics. On the one hand, the provision of informative ratings increases, and receivers are not paying for the provision subsidy. On the other hand,
the amount of information conveyed with each rating is more restricted. Similarly, providing such
a transfer may or may not help increase product sales for the marketplace. From the market platform’s perspective, this conditional transfer can be sensible both as a short-run marketing response
to the Baseline setting, and in the long run. If a large mass of final consumers have reservations
just above θ̄, such a policy will be very effective. Every provided rating is predicted to have a positive influence on sales. A rating with the content “A  B” leads to expected qualities satisfying
νA (A  B) > θ̄ > νB (A  B). As such, every provided and viewed rating is predicted to increase WTP to νA (A  B) from θ̄. In comparison, in the aligned-interest setting, many provided
ratings will simply say that a particular product is below average, having no effect on total sales.
The sales benefits from this type of incentive have a limit though, and in environments where
the large mass of receivers have reservations far above νA (A  B) (or for that matter below θ̄), a
sales-incentive will be ineffective at generating increased market revenue. In the Baseline and Receiver cases there are equilibria where senders with very good product experiences can influence
high-reservation receivers. In Marketplace though, the lack of alignment between S and R over
WTP limits the extent to which a high-reservation receivers can be persuaded to purchase—no receiver with ω > νA (A  B) will ever make a purchase in equilibrium. Similarly, for any receivers

46

If α is very large and T small, more-informative equilibria exist. In cases where T is not large enough for senders to
provide at every cs (and α is not negligibly small) changes in the probability of providing a rating given the signal x
must also be incorporated. This effect is very small under our experimental parameterization at the equilibrium, and
so we will not focus on it in our discussion of the theory.
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with ω < θ̄ , sales-conditioned incentives are ineffective marketing tools for marketplaces, as these
receivers would have purchased a product even in the absence of any provided information.
Producer Transfer. Our final institution considers a transfer to senders provided by the specific
producer X ∈ {A, B} with which the sender has product experience (through a unique coupon
in product X’s packaging, say). Here we consider the transfer T to the sender only if the receiver
purchases the specific product X,

1 if Z = X,
ψ S (m, ρ, Z) =
0 otherwise,
where we again set ψ R = 0 in all situations, as the transfer is paid for by the producer X. We could
strengthen the condition and require that the rating be viewed as well, however the equilibrium
outcome would be essentially the same.
Whenever the transfer T is large relative to α, the only equilibria are babbling and involve
zero-information transfer (where the appendix provides a sufficient condition). If receivers view
and alter their purchasing decisions based on ratings (either substituting between products, or increasing their WTP) then senders have a signal-independent incentive to choose the rating that
increases the likelihood of an X sale. As such, in any equilibrium, ratings convey no meaningful information about X, and receivers choose not to view as cR > 0. Though such incentives
may generate a significant sales boost to producers in the short-run if introduced without receiver’s
knowledge, the effect is to poison the well in the long run as receivers learn of their presence. Any
transfers made from the producer X to the sender that are linked to sales are therefore predicted to
be ineffective in equilibrium.
More developed and detailed constructions for the theory, and a formal description of the equilibrium concept used to generate the theoretic predictions are provided in the appendix.
We will examine equilibria of this game (and modifications where we provide conditional
transfers of utility to and from S and R) within a simple message space M = {1A , 2A , . . . , KA } ∪
{1B , 2B , . . . , KB }. That is, we allow a rating from 1 to K to be sent for either product. We will
examine equilibria of the game that satisfy the following symmetry requirements.
Definition. A symmetric rating equilibrium (SRE) is a Perfect Bayesian equilibrium with actions

?
?
µ? , (ρ, ζm
, ζM
, ζ∅? ) and a corresponding belief system λS , λR with the property that:
(i) If µ? (X, x, cS ) = MY for X, Y ∈ {A, B} then for X 0 6= X and Y 0 6= Y , µ? (X 0 , x, cS ) =
MY 0 .
(ii) If for X ∈ {A, B} the provision strategy is µ? (X, x, cS ) = m∅ then it must be that for
X 0 6= X that the strategy satisfies µ? (X 0 , x, cS ) = m∅ .
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(iii) For any receiver information set I, whenever νA (I) = νB (I) > ω, R’s final choice is a
( 21 , 12 ) mixture over {A, B}. When ω = max {νA (I) , νB (I)}, the receiver chooses R.
This definition is a refinement over the set of equilibria, and asks both players S and R to treat
producers A and B symmetrically. For S the restriction asks that her selected ratings responds
symmetrically to similar information on products A and B. For example, given a send cost cS , if
she gets a signal (A, x) and sends the rating mA , then the refinement requires that given the signal
(B, x) she sends the rating mB . Note that this equilibrium refinement does not restrict the specific
rating chosen. For instance, the strategy could be µ? (A, x, cS ) = mB (sending a B rating given a
signal from A), with the symmetry requirement that µ? (B, x, cS ) = mA . The refinement similarly
enforces symmetric decisions on whether or not to provide a message given comparable quality
draws from A and B—though this would endogenously arise given parts (1) and (3). Finally,
the last part breaks indifference symmetrically, indifference between a product and the outside
option is broken in favor of the outside option; indifference over the products results in an equal
randomization over a product purchase
The refinement eliminates asymmetric equilibria. Such equilibria are potentially interesting,
and can be more efficient than the symmetric case, as the cheap empty message becomes more
informative. However, such asymmetric equilibria require fairly significant coordination, and our
laboratory data indicate such outcomes are not focal. Our focus is on cases where communication
from S to R breaks the initial product symmetry, rather than examining equilibrium coordination.
Proposition. An SRE always exists for the rating game
A babbling PBE, (µ̇, Not View, ζ̇) can always be constructed that meets the symmetry restrictions. For example, senders with costs cS ≤ 0 send the rating 1X for all signals (X, x), and so
satisfying parts (1) and (2). Because the ratings are uninformative about the sender’s observed
quality level x, receivers do not listen, as cR > 0. The receiver’s subsequent choice is simply to
maximize expected utility given consistent beliefs, and he responds at all histories by randomizing
equally over the two products when ω < θ̄, and choosing the outside option whenever ω ≥ θ̄,
and so meeting part (3). However, more informative SRE can exist, and our focus now shifts to
characterizing the best-case.
Given the assumption that α > 0, senders and receivers fully agree on the choice Z ∈
{A, B, R} at all possible information sets. Conditional on providing a rating m 6= m∅ , senders and
receivers have a common interest in revealing information. In fact, full-revelation of all decisionrelevant information can be communicated even when the number of available ratings is lower
than the number of possible signals (K < N ). This is because whenever S’s draw (X, x) implies
that product X 0 is strictly better than product X, then all that needs to be conveyed is the ordinal
information “do not buy X.” Any space M that is rich enough to distinguish between each of the
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signals that imply νX (x) > θ̄, plus a single additional rating implying νX (x) ≤ θ̄, conveys all the
necessary information.47
More specifically, given K ratings for each product, and cR small enough for viewing to be
rational, the most-informative SRE, has the following intuitive form: Given an (X, x, cS )-type
sender the rating strategy is characterized by a continuous provision cutoff c? : νX (Θ) → R and
?
?
an interval partition [ν0? , ν1? ), [ν1 , ν2? ), . . ., [νK−1
, νK
] such that

 JX if νX (x) ∈ [νJ−1 , νJ ) and cS ≤ c? (νX (x) ; J) ,
?
S
µ X, x, c =
m∅ otherwise.
This strategy for S transforms the observed signal into an expected quality level for R if he chooses
product X, νX (x). Breaking the expected quality into K-intervals through K − 1 strategy param
?
eters ν1? , . . . , νK−1
(where ν0 = min Θ and νK = max Θ). The sender provides the relevant
rating Xk whenever the effective cost cS/α is not too high. Defining the expected quality given a

rating JX as ν̄J := E zX µ(X, x, cS ) = JX , the receiver’s decision is to always view so long as
cR is less than the expected benefit of viewing. All beliefs are pinned down by Bayes’ rule, and
the receiver’s sequentially rational response to the message Xk is



if ω ≥ max ν̄J , θ̄

R

ζJ?X (ω) = X
if ν̄J > max ω, θ̄


 0
X 6= X otherwise.
That is, the receiver chooses: i) the reservation if it is better than both alternatives; ii) the rated product X if the ratings implies it is better than average and the drawn reservation; and iii) the unrated
product if m indicates X is below average, and the reservation draw is smaller than θ̄. Completing the specification of the game, sequential rationality implies there are two reservation cutoffs




ν∅ = 12 · E νX (x) µ X, x, cS = m∅ + 21 · θ̄ and νM = 12 · E νX (x) µ X, x, cS 6= m∅ + 12 θ̄,
where the strategies for receivers who do not receive a message, or who do not listen are


R
R
if
ω
≥
ν
if ω ≥ νM
∅
?
?
ζ∅ (ω) =
and ζM (ω) =
 1 · A ⊕ 1 · B otherwise
 1 A ⊕ 1 B otherwise,
2

2

2

2

respectively. When α is small, these two decisions will be close to the symmetric decisions in a
babbling equilibrium, where ν∅ ' νM ' θ̄, though they must adapt somewhat to selection effects
in provision as the cutoff c? is signal-dependent.48
47

Where there are multiple senders, ratings which delineate between differing below average levels will aid convergence.
48
Numerically solving for an equilibrium involves searching for the fixed point vector (ν 1 , ..., ν̄K , ν∅ ) that satisfies
the sender ICC and cutoff calculations below, where νM can be calculated subsequently. In the limit, as α → 0, the
provision decision becomes independent of the signal, and a fixed-point calculation can be avoided.
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Incentive compatibility requires that for all k = 1, . . . , K − 1 the sender’s messaging interval
parameters satisfy


(1)
vk? = E ω ν̄k+1 ≥ ω > max ν̄k , θ̄ .
This condition essentially requires that indifference between messages kX and (k + 1)X is set so
that the loss made through receivers with reservations ω ∈ (ν ? , ν̄k+1 ) choosing the product is equal
to the gain from convincing receivers with ω ∈ (ν̄k , ν ? ) to choose the product over the reservation
(where for ν̄1 we replace the average implied quality with the unconditional average). The cost
cutoff for providing any rating at all is given by

(2)


c? (νX (x); J) = α · Pr {ω < ν J } max {θ, νX (x)} − Pr {ω < ν∅ }

1
θ̄
2



+ 12 νX (x) + κB
J

where
κB
J = Pr {ω ≥ ν J } E (ω |ω ≥ ν J ) − Pr {ω ≥ ν∅ } E (ω |ω ≥ ν∅ ) .
The cutoff here is continuous (because of equation 1) and piecewise linear. For all signals with an
implied quality for X of ν ≤ θ̄, the cutoff is linearly decreasing in the implied quality νX (x) with
slope − 21 · Pr {ω < ν∅ }, the likelihood the provided rating changes the receiver’s decision. For
ν > θ̄, the cost cutoff is increasing, where the slope depends on the specific rating JX selected, as
the rating choice changes R’s WTP. Additionally, given the form of µ? , as α → 0, the cost cutoff
below which the sender will provide a rating tends to zero for every possible signal x.

A.1. Transfer Mechanisms. Behavior is fairly intuitive in the baseline model, and in addition,
SRE are not terribly difficult to compute. The main tension present in the model is that even the
most-informative equilibria of the game are inefficient. Where the equilibrium has senders provide
a message when cS ≤ α · c? (νX (x)), a sender maximizing the joint utility of the sender and η
representative receivers would provide a message when cS ≤ (α + η) · c? (νX (x)). The remainder
of our theory section will sketch out equilibria in the three alternative transfer mechanisms.

Receiver Transfer. In any informative equilibria where receivers view messages, this policy reduces the effective send costs for S. When a message costs cS to provide, the effective cost when
the message is viewed is cS − η · T . The most-informative equilibrium here is similar to that in the
baseline with the cost distribution G shifted the left by η · T . That is the cost cutoffs for providing
in the receiver setting are given by
(3)



c? (νX (x); J) = η · T + α · Pr {ω < ν J } max {θ, νX (x)} − Pr {ω < ν∅ } 21 θ̄ + 12 νX (x) + κR
J ,
B
where κR
J = κJ .
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The first-order change here is to increasing the number of meaningful messages provided.
Given the shift in the cutoffs, there are second-order effects from the shape of G(·) that require
recalculation of the expected qualities (ν 1 , . . . , ν K , ν∅ , νM ) and rating cutoffs.49
Marketplace Transfer. Similar to the Receiver transfer, in informative equilibria the Marketplace
incentive has the effect of reducing sender costs, thereby increasing provision. However, if the
transfer is large in relation to the altruism term α, the transfer has a negative effect on the ratings
possible. The sender and receiver are now only partially aligned in interests. Senders benefit from
receivers increasing their WTP, though they are still aligned with the receiver over which particular
product A or B should be chosen. The most informative SSRE is now characterized by senders
providing just two message, with the effective meanings “A  B” and “B  A.”
Calculation of these equilibria is easier than the above and requires calculating the fixed points
ν∅ and ν. The cost-cutoff for provision is given by




c? (νX (x)) = Pr {ω < ν}·ηT +α· Pr {ω < ν} max θ̄, νX (x) − Pr {ω < ν∅ } 12 θ̄ + 21 νX (x) + κV
where
κV

= Pr {ω ≥ ν} E (ω |ω ≥ ν ) − Pr {ω ≥ ν∅ } E (ω |ω ≥ ν∅ ) .

The WTP given a provided message is calculated as
o
o n
o
n
n
ν = Pr νX (x) ≤ θ̄ m ∈ M · θ̄ +Pr νX (X) > θ̄ m ∈ M ·E νX (x) m ∈ M, νX (X) > θ̄ ,
where in the limit as α → 0 we can remove the conditioning on provision.
Producer Transfer. For the producer transfer, if no message breaks the belief’s symmetry, then
there is no value in viewing, and the equilibrium is uninformative. For any rating m that is viewed
in an SRE that does break the receiver’s symmetry of belief, this must produce a gain in sales of
at least 12 H(θ̄)—one of the two products must have an expectation of at least θ̄, and sequential
rationality implies this product is bought H(ν(m)) of the time. For our experimental parameterization, a sufficient (though not necessary) condition for babbling being the only outcome is met by
1
· T · H(θ̄) > α · maxθ∈Θ θ − θ̄ . That is the minimum gain through the incentive from making
2
the owned product focal exceeds the maximal altruistic difference in expected quality.

49

In our experimental setting, these effects are only non-negligible for ν∅ , due to a very small likelihood of no
provision.
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A PPENDIX B. R ESERVATION D ISTRIBUTION S HIFTS
Different choices for the reservation distribution H(ω) will directly affect the rate of sales, and
therefore the desirability of the different institutions to each party in the market. Changing this
distribution affects both babbling and informative equilibria. Efficiency, receiver welfare and the
same-product sales rate are all directly related to the distribution H.
As a counterfactual exercise, we examine outcomes in the best-case equilibria across a family
of reservation distributions. Where the experimental distribution H is (approximately) parameterized by a beta distribution (rescaled to a [0, 100] support) with a mean reservation of 100/n3 and stano
√
dard deviation of 50 2/3, we now look at the effects across a family of beta distributions Ĥσ (ω)
σ
indexed by a scalar parameter σ. Setting the beta distribution’s two shape parameters we examine
variance-preserving shifts of the mean, where the expected reservation is set to the parameter σ,
where the standard deviation is fixed to that in the experimental distribution H.
Figures 2(A,C,E,G) indicate theoretical differences (in the most-informative equilibrium) relative to the Baseline environment over efficiency, receiver welfare, total sales and same-product
sales, respectively. For instance, in Figure 2(A) we indicate the efficiency difference Υ(σ; ψ) −
Υ(σ; Base.), and in Figure 2(C) the receiver welfare difference ΥR (σ; ψ)−ΥR (σ; Base.).50 In each
figure, the dashed vertical line at σ = 100/3 indicates the experimental parameterization.
The theoretical comparisons here assume the most-informative equilibrium, however we know
that subjects are more honest than predicted, and also deviate from theory in their rating, viewing
and WTP behavior. We now extrapolate from the observed experimental behavior across the family of WTP distributions using the elicited reservation cutoffs in the last half of each experimental
session. To do this, we make some assumptions on how behavior changes as we alter H. First, we
assume changes in H do not affect the ratings selected m̂it after each signal xit , or the reservation
cutoff Ωjt selected at each information set Ijt .51 Second, we incorporate changes to both the provision and viewing rates in each environment through a logit response to the expected benefits/costs
at σ. Using the experimental variation in the environment, we estimate subjects’ provision and
viewing elasticities with respect to changes in the expected monetary incentives and realized monetary benefits of viewing, respectively. Table 8 contains details of the estimation procedure and

50

The scale and normalization for efficiency are also functions of σ. That is, the expected upper bound given full
information, W σ , and the expected outcome under babbling, W σ , are both affected by the choice of H(·), where
W σ − W σ is decreasing in σ. The discontinuity in the Receiver comparison stems from a critical σafter which it is no
longer rational to view ratings, so that the babbling equilibrium is the most-informative.
51
Given the specified reservations we calculate the expected total sales rate as Sales(σ)
=
P
P30
1
1
Ĥ
(Ω
),
while
the
rate
of
same
product
sales
is
calculated
as
Product(σ)
=
jt
j∈S 10
t=21 σ
|S|
P
P30
1
1
j∈S 10
t=21 Ĥσ (Ωjt ) · 1 {Zjt = Xit }. We here focus on the last ten rounds, allowing rounds 16 to 20
|S|
for subjects to gain experience with the WTP elicitation.
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F IGURE 2. Changes relative to Baseline with a reservation distribution Ĥσ

40

σ

assessed parameters. We use this estimated logit response to extrapolate how the provision and
viewing rates vary as σ changes.52
TABLE 8. Counterfactual Provision/View Response Model
Provision
Constant, C

-0.405

Viewing
???

0.356

(0.072)

Incentive Difference, ∆U (ψ, λ)

0.00674

???

(0.166)
???

(0.0071)

Payoff Difference, ∆V (ψ, λ)

0.0211

???

(0.0041)

(
0.677
0

Reciprocity, δV (ψ)
Probability Model

exp {Cp (ψ) + 0.00674 · ∆U (ψ, λ)}
exp {Cp (ψ) + 0.00674 · ∆U (ψ, λ)} + 1

if R or M treatment ???
otherwise

(0.169)
exp {CV (ψ) + 0.0211 · ∆V (ψ, λ)}
exp {CV (ψ) + 0.0211∆V (ψ, λ)} + 1

Note: Results are estimated from a logit regression in the last 10 rounds where ∆U (ψ, 33.3) (the difference in the
expected incentive payment from providing/not) and ∆V (ψ, 33.3) (the expected payoff difference from viewing/not)
are calculated from the empirical response in rounds 21–30. The counterfactual model uses changes in the monetary incentive to provide/view to model the change in each. N.B. The ensuing Pr {Provision |λ, ψ } incorporates the
viewing probability Pr {View |λ, ψ } through the ∆U (ψ, λ) term, as the incentives can be a functions of viewing rates.

Figures 2(B,D,F,H) indicate the differences in efficiency, receiver welfare and sales relative
to the Baseline in these behavioral extrapolations. Again, in each panel, the vertical dotted-line
indicates the distribution used in the experiment, H(ω). The behavioral counterfactuals indicate
fairly constant efficiency gains in the Receiver environment, where Figure 2(B) indicates increasing
gains in Receiver over Marketplace as σ increases. This effect stems from greater WTP following
positive ratings in both aligned-interest environments, which becomes more and more important
as average reservations increase. However, other than total efficiency, which reflects the sender’s
preference for Receiver across the entire range of σ, the behavioral extrapolations indicate the other
participants (receivers, marketplaces, producers with existing consumers) prefer the Marketplace
institution for the large central range of σ. Though the preference ordering changes somewhat
when average reservations are especially high or especially low, we see the results as favoring the
use of sales-linked incentives for information sharing, if marketplaces are willing to pay for these
programs.
52

As reservations increase, receivers viewing behavior decreases as ratings are less useful to those unlikely to purchase
a product. The combined effect of reduced viewing and reduced sales also alters the benefits to providing a rating in
each of our environments, and so provision falls. The two effects are modeled in the counterfactual through a response
to the expected difference in payoff from providing/viewings where Provision(σ; ψ) is therefore a function of both
Viewing(σ) and the environment ψ. This exercise is analogous to calculating a logit quantal response equilibrium,
where we fix the observed rating and WTP behavior.
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Figure 2(F) indicates the total sales difference between the Baseline and each incentive environment, measured as the percentage of receivers who buy any product. Similarly, Figure 2(H)
provides information on the change in sales for the specific product Xit sampled by the sender. In
the experiment we see similar total sales in the Baseline, Receiver and Marketplace treatments in
the last ten rounds, and somewhat reduced sales in Producer. Figure 2(H) illustrates the relative
sales increases in Marketplace as we increase the average reservation away from the experimental
parameterization (though, in absolute terms sales decrease as σ increases).
Though the sales gains in Marketplace are relatively small at our parameterization, as outside
options increase, so too does the relative sales benefit to the marketplace. Once we raise the
expected outside option to σ = θ̄, the Marketplace treatment’s total sales fall to 0.543, where this is
significantly larger than either the Baseline or Receiver treatments at 0.514 and 0.513, respectively.
The relative effect in Marketplace grows even larger as average reservations increase. For σ = 64,
though the total fraction of the population making a purchase is lower in all treatments, the relative
gain in the Marketplace setting is largest, with a 12 percent increase in sales volume over the
Baseline. By contrast, the Receiver environment produces a negative and insignificant sales effect
relative to the Baseline for higher values of σ, primarily due to reduced viewing behavior.53
Moreover, the same-product sales rate in Figure 2(H) is larger in Marketplace than Producer
when average reservations are high. From the point of view of manufacturers, Producer is only
superior to Marketplace when consumers are very likely to purchase anyway. Though specific
producers might benefit in the short-run from covertly offering such incentives to their previous
customers, there is little or no long-run benefit when the status quo is a Marketplace environment.
A PPENDIX C. F OR O NLINE P UBLICATION : B EHAVIORAL E FFICIENCY L OSSES
Given the observed sender and receiver behavior, we can examine which elements of that
behavior produce the largest losses or gains in overall information efficiency. We use the strategymethod data provided in the last 15 rounds of each session to examine how efficiency and receiver
welfare change as we modify individual components of observed behavior, holding the rest of
the behavior constant. We examine three shifts in behavior: i) senders using an empirical best
response (provision and rating selection); ii) receivers always choosing to view provided ratings;
and iii) receivers using the risk-neutral empirical best response WTP cutoffs for low ratings, high
ratings and when no rating is sent. We summarize the changes in total information efficiency for
each counterfactual behavior in Table 9.
53

Our model for provision and listening decreases with σ at a greater rate in the Receiver treatment. In the experiment,
the difference in the rate of provision in the last ten rounds between Receiver and Baseline is 0.268, while listening
rates are near identical. At σ = 65 the counterfactual model reduces the provision difference to 0.216 (reflecting a
drop in the expected receiver transfer stemming from reduced viewing). Listening rates are modeled as falling by
0.104 in Baseline, and 0.157 in Receiver.
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TABLE 9. Efficiency Gains/Losses from Component Best-Responses (last 15 rounds)
Baseline Receiver Marketplace Producer
Observed Info. Efficiency 7.58% 25.72%

17.36%

-7.41%

Sender Empirical BR

7.56% 22.90%

40.37%

-9.66%

All Viewing
All Viewing (Rec. Welfare)
Receiver BR Cutoffs: 1,2
Receiver BR Cutoffs: 4,5
Receiver BR Cutoffs: m∅

7.98% 9.10%
7.38% -1.01%
2.06% 1.87%
4.84% 9.56%
6.33% 3.13%

3.15%
2.85%
5.82%
14.66%
4.98%

6.19%
5.35%
2.43%
8.62%
10.51%

Note: All counterfactuals represent changes in efficiency relative to the first row. Each counterfactual holds constant
the observed sender and receiver behavior in the last 15 rounds, except for: i) the Sender Best Response counterfactual
considers a change to sender behavior where the optimal cost cutoff and rating choice is used; ii) the All Viewing
counterfactual assumes receivers view all sent ratings. iii) the Cutoff counterfactuals consider the gain from changing
receiver cutoffs to the empirical best response cutoff.

The very first row provides the analog to the information efficiency given in Table 2, where we
calculate the value using just the last 15 rounds (and where we incorporate the additional precision
on intensities from the cutoffs into the calculation). This treatment efficiency will be the level
against which we measure the changes in efficiency for each counterfactual.
Our first shift in behavior holds constant the receivers’ response (viewing, urn and reservation
decisions) but has senders use an empirical best response, one that maximizes their expected payoff
given the observed receiver behavior. That is, we calculate the best response rating µ̂(X, x, ct ) for
all signals x and costs cS , where the rating strategies are summarized in the appendix. Changing the
sender’s response in this way affects both the quantity and quality of provision. Though there are
small positive effects in the Baseline, the largest benefits from this change are within the Receiver
and Marketplace treatments, where the vast majority of the efficiency gains are from increased
rating provision. The relative efficiency decrease in the Producer treatment stems from optimally
behaving senders being dishonest more often than we observe, thereby reducing rating quality and
final receiver outcomes.
In the second counterfactual, All Viewing, we force every receiver to view all provided rating,
fixing their response to each particular rating to the average observed behavior. There are moderate gains here in the Receiver and Baseline treatments, however once we account for the cost of
viewing (in the receiver welfare row), the potential efficiency gains in Receiver actually become a
small loss.54
54

Though it is an empirical best response to view a rating in all treatments, it is not so if receivers react sub-optimally
to the provided rating.
43

Finally, the last three rows examine efficiency changes if receivers use the empirical bestresponse WTP in reaction to: low ratings (ones and twos); high ratings (fours and fives); and no
rating. Here the largest absolute gains are through the response to high ratings, as subjects exhibit
lower WTP after seeing a four or five than is optimal in all treatments. Here the figures reflect
unconditional efficiency increases, but conditional on a positive rating being provided the gains
in each treatment are more comparable: a 49 percentage point gain in Baseline, 48 points in both
Receiver and Marketplace, and a 42 percentage point gain in Producer.
The last row in the table indicates the efficiency gains from changes to the receivers response
following no provision, where the largest total efficiency gains are possible in the Baseline and
Producer, which have the lowest probabilities of provision. Controlling for the rate at which
information is not provided, the conditional efficiency gains from receivers best responding are a
ten percentage point efficiency gain in Baseline, an eight point gain in Receiver, and much larger
gains of fourteen and twenty percentage points in Marketplace and Producer, respectively. These
results therefore point to large increases if receivers were to understood the provision selections
effects under the misaligned incentives.
Result 5 (Improved Efficiency). The largest potential increase in total efficiency from participants
best responding to observed play stems from increases to rating provision in the Receiver and
Marketplace environments.

44

A PPENDIX D. F OR O NLINE P UBLICATION —A DDITIONAL F IGURES AND TABLES
TABLE 10. Risk-Averse Equilibrium Predictions
Baseline (B) Receiver (R) Marketplace Producer (P) Comp. Static
(M)
Distinct Messages
Message Provision
Info. Efficiency, Υ
Rec. Welfare, ΥR
Sales
Prod. Recurrence
Info. Efficiency, Υ

10
0.315
31.6%
29.7%
0.746
0.396

10
2
0/Babbling
0.975
0.899
0.304
96.8%
68.2%
0.0%
29.6%
62.6%
0.0%
0.801
0.764
0.7191
0.463
0.403
0.360
Conditional on no provided rating
-1.3%
-4.46%
-0.7%
0.0%

RMBP
RMBP
MBRP
RMBP
RMBP
PMBR

Conditional on provided rating
View Rate,
Info. Efficiency Υ
Rec. Welfare ΥR
Sales

1.0
102.8%
96.6%
0.805

1.0
99.4%
30.6%
0.803

1.0
76.0%
69.8%
0.770

0.0
0.0%
-6.3%
0.719

B∼R∼MP
B RMP
BMRP
MBRP

Conditional on provided rating and sale
Prod. Recurrence

0.588

0.580

0.530

0.500

BRMP

1−r

Note: Figures assume expected-utility Bernoulli function v(x) = x1−r for r = 0.3 (see Holt and Laury 2002 for
empirical evidence of typical risk-aversion levels). Babbling given this risk aversion level has an efficiency of -0.6
percent relative to the risk-neutral baselines, while full communication has an efficiency of 99.4 percent. 10-message
equilibria send regions 1–47, 48–60, 61–72, 73–86, 87–100. Marketplace equilibrium is to send 5Y for Y 6= X5 and
θSX in 1–47, and 5X for θSX in 48–100.

TABLE 11. Risk-Neutral Sender’s Empirical Best Response
Baseline

Receiver

Marketplace

Producer

Provision

0.334

0.904

0.882

0.568

Optimal Ratings

4, Same Urn,
x > 50.5
4, Other Urn,
x ≤ 50.5

5, Same Urn,
x > 55
4, Same Urn
,55 ≥ x > 50.5
4, Other Urn,
x ≤ 50.5

4, Same Urn,
x > 50.5
4, Other Urn,
x ≤ 50.5

5, Same urn, all x
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F IGURE 3. Sender behavior
Note:
Each column corresponding to a treatment. The first five rows show histograms of the signals drawn by senders who
choose each of the ratings one through five. For each selected rating, the height of each white bar indicates the fraction
of all rounds with a signal in that bin. Gay bars indicate the46fraction of rounds where the selected rating was ultimately
sent. White shaded regions indicate selected ratings that were ultimately not sent after the sender observed the cost of
rating.
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F IGURE 4. Provision as a function of rating cost .
Note: Probability of provision as a function of the send cost is recovered via a Gaussian kernel regression. Subject
cutoffs in (B) are estimated from the final 5 rounds of the experiment; distributions include smoothing for clarity
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